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SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING 
Michael D. Guttentag* 
Abstract 
Determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information should trigger insider trading liability is a deeply problematic 
aspect of insider trading doctrine. 
The current rule is that a selective disclosure can only trigger insider 
trading liability if “the insider [making the selective disclosure] 
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks 
v. SEC introduced this “personal benefit” test in 1983 to balance four 
competing rationales for determining when a tip should trigger insider 
trading liability. Two developments since Dirks have made problems 
with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC’s enactment 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 supplanted federal common law 
regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, more 
pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the types 
of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts that the Dirks personal 
benefit test was designed to protect. Second, in United States v. O’Hagan 
the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory, which greatly 
expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could trigger insider trading 
liability.  
After Regulation FD and O’Hagan, only a test for when a selective 
disclosure triggers insider trading liability based directly on the statutory 
prohibition against deceptive conduct makes sense. Receipt of a personal 
benefit should be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for finding that 
a selective disclosure is deceptive enough to trigger insider trading 
liability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
White collar crime tends to be a small group affair for both 
psychological and operational reasons. In terms of psychology, small 
groups often act in ways that go beyond limits individuals set for 
themselves.1 In terms of operations, it is almost always easier to carry out 
a fraud when working in cahoots with others.2  
The factors that encourage small group deviance in white collar crime 
generally are at work in the context of insider trading. Many, if not most, 
incidents of insider trading are carried out by small groups, rather than by 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious 
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180–81 (2005); Michael D. Guttentag et 
al., Brandeis’ Policeman: Results from a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate 
Fraud, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 239, 245 (2008); Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to 
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 651, 660 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000).  
 2. Guttentag et al., supra note 1, at 245. 
2
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an individual acting alone.3 Therefore, insider trading often involves not 
one, but two wrongs. The first is the improper selective disclosure of 
material nonpublic information, and the second is the act of trading based 
upon that information.4 Unfortunately, the doctrine courts use to evaluate 
the legality of the first of these wrongs, the selective disclosure of 
material nonpublic information, is confused and increasingly obsolete.5  
                                                                                                                     
 3. For example, most of the insider trading prosecution and enforcement actions reported 
by the SEC for the 2016 fiscal year involved small groups, rather than an individual acting alone. 
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2016 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-
03/secstats2016.pdf (stating that less than 25% of the reported insider trading cases involved 
individuals acting alone). Of course, insider trading prosecution and enforcement actions may 
provide a biased representation of the underlying occurrence of insider trader violations, both 
because not all violations are detected and because not all detected violations are prosecuted.  
 4. Throughout this Article selective disclosure specifically refers to situations in which a 
disclosure of material nonpublic information is made absent any specific contractual or fiduciary 
obligation on the part of the recipient of the information to keep the information confidential or 
to refrain from trading based on the information. 
 5. Surprisingly few articles in the vast literature on insider trading consider how best to 
determine the wrongfulness of selectively disclosing information. In his treatise on insider trading 
law, Donald Langevoort acknowledges this shortcoming, and concludes after reviewing tipper 
and tippee liability in the misappropriation context that “[t]his entire subject of tipping without 
specific intent to enable trading—including the place of personal benefit in all this—deserves 
clarification, if not wholesale revision.” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING 
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 6:13, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016) 
(footnote omitted). 
The most closely related literature is that which considers the practicalities of applying the 
personal benefit test in various scenarios. See, e.g., Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote 
Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181 (2005/2006); Craig W. Davis, Comment, Misappropriators, Tippees 
and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What Can We Learn from Cady, Roberts, 35 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 263 (2004); Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability for Tippers and Tippees: A Call 
for the Consistent Application of the Personal Benefit Test, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 265, 268 (2003); 
Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 
GA. L. REV. 179, 213–14 (1991); Jeffrey Plotkin, The Tipper Benefit Test Under the 
Misappropriation Theory, 230 N.Y. L.J. 33 (August 15, 2003); Allison M. Vissichelli, Note, Intent 
to Reconcile: SEC v. Obus, The Second Circuit’s Edification of the Tippee Scienter Standard, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 763, 767 (2013).  
Recently, some of the more basic questions as to what makes selective disclosure a 
manipulative or deceptive practice have finally started to receive attention in light of a circuit split 
regarding what constitutes a personal benefit (discussed infra Section II.B.). See Richard A. 
Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading after United States v. Newman, 
125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1485 (2016); Jonathan R. Macey, Beyond the Personal Benefit Test: The 
Economics of Tipping by Insiders, 2 J.L. & PUB. AFF. 27 (2017); Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: 
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Nagy, Beyond 
Dirks]; A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 859 
(2015) [hereinafter Pritchard on Dirks]; Mark Hayden Adams, Note, Insider Trading Law that 
Works: Using Newman and Salman to Update Dirks’s Personal Benefit Standard, 49 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 575 (2016); Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift 
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 833, 835 (2016). 
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The rule that determines when a selective disclosure triggers insider 
trading liability has important policy ramifications. Too lax a rule makes 
it simple to circumvent the prohibition against insider trading by passing 
information along among a small group of confederates.6 Too strict a rule 
might criminalize legitimate efforts to share corporate information with 
those outside the firm.7  
Much of the challenge in identifying wrongful selective disclosure 
arises because current doctrine is increasingly obsolete. What is the cause 
of this obsolescence? One reason is that the prohibition against insider 
trading in the United States is largely a creation of federal common law, 
derived from the statutory prohibition against using a “manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security.8 It therefore falls to the federal judiciary to update rules for 
                                                                                                                     
 6. For example, the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman dismissed the case against 
defendants Anthony Chiasson and Tod Newman in part because neither defendant had knowledge 
of the personal benefit, if any, received by those who first selectively disclosed the nonpublic 
information. 773 F.3d 438, 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2014). For a discussion of this aspect of the Newman 
holding, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 14. One implication of the holding in Newman 
is that to avoid insider trading liability one could simply pass material nonpublic information 
through a series of at least two tippees, without providing the person who ultimately trades 
information about the motivation of the party who was the original source. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Newman and Selective Disclosure, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/newman-and-selective-disclosure/ (expressing 
concern that the Newman decision reads “almost as a roadmap for selective disclosure”). See 
generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee 
Liability: SACs, Steven Cohen, and the Court’s Opinion in Dirks, 15 TRANSACTIONS 47 (2013). 
 7. The possibility of criminal liability arises under Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 
which also requires that the violation be knowing and willful:  
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any 
rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than 
$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both . . . ; but no person 
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule 
or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation. 
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012). 
 8. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as amended provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange— 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
4
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determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information is sufficiently deceptive to constitute a violation of federal 
securities law.9 
Judges have generally looked to common law precedent to determine 
what constitutes a deceptive practice in securities markets. For example, 
to answer the question of when trading based on material nonpublic 
information can be deceptive, the Supreme Court relied on the common 
law doctrine that silence is deceptive only when one party in a transaction 
owes a fiduciary duty to the other.10 However, no obvious common law 
                                                                                                                     
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). For a comprehensive review of this Section of the Exchange Act, see generally 
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 385 (1990) (providing a review of the events leading up to Section 10(b)’s enactment). 
Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
With respect to the federal common law nature of insider trading jurisprudence, see, for 
example, United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Dirks, and 
indeed all the Supreme Court cases dealing with insider trading, have implicitly assumed that the 
relevant fiduciary duty is a matter of federal common law . . . .”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis 
F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930 
(2003) (“Powell saw Rules 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of ‘federal common law.’”). 
 9. As evidenced by the decision in Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the 
Supreme Court has shown a decided lack of interest in carrying out such an updating in the context 
of determining when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading liability. See Michael D. 
Guttentag, Salman Insider-Trading Case a Hollow Win for Prosecutors, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Dec. 14, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/14/salman-insider-trading-case-a-
hollow-win-for-prosecutors/. For a discussion of the Supreme Court avoiding updating securities 
regulation more generally, see Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: 
Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 847 (2017).  
 10. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 232–33 (1980) (“But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when 
he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that 
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
5
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precedent suggests how to determine when the selective disclosure of 
material nonpublic information constitutes a deceptive practice.11 
Dirks v. SEC,12 the one Supreme Court case to consider at length the 
relationship between selective disclosure and insider trading, might 
appear to have resolved much of the uncertainty about when a selective 
disclosure may trigger insider trading liability. The Court in Dirks held 
that a selective disclosure by an insider will only trigger insider trading 
liability if “the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from 
his disclosure.”13 Most courts and scholars interpret the Dirks opinion as 
resolving the question of how to determine when a selective disclosure is 
wrongful.14 The Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the 
Dirks personal benefit test in Salman v. United States.15 
But the personal benefit test, even in 1983, was an imperfect effort to 
balance four different and in many ways competing rationales for 
determining when a selective disclosure should trigger insider trading 
liability.16 Two developments since Dirks have made problems with the 
personal benefit test insurmountable.17 First, the SEC’s enactment of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 largely supplanted the federal 
common law regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, 
more pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the 
types of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts the Dirks personal 
benefit test was designed to protect.18 Second, the adoption of the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan19 
greatly expanded the types of deceptive conduct that might lead to insider 
                                                                                                                     
confidence between them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1976))). 
But in grounding the insider trading prohibition in common law, the Court did not strictly 
abide by any particular fiduciary duty or common law precedent. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading 
and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1337 (2009) (“From a 
doctrinal perspective, the Court’s fiduciary foundation for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-
5 was shaky from the start.”). 
 11. But see Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading 
After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1507 (2016) (arguing that issues related to 
the wrongfulness of selective disclosure can be satisfactorily addressed by looking to common 
law principles developed to prohibit the use of ill-gotten property). 
 12. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  
 13. Id. at 662. 
 14. E.g., Pritchard, supra note 8, at 859. 
 15. 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016). 
 16. See infra Section I.A. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015); see infra 
Section II.A. 
 19. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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trading liability with important ramifications for how to identify tipper 
wrongdoing.20 
A reconsideration of the four justifications that originally led to the 
adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks, in light of changes wrought 
by Regulation FD and O’Hagan, shows why evidence of a personal 
benefit should no longer be a required element to find that a selective 
disclosure is sufficiently deceptive to trigger insider trading liability.21  
Fortunately, there is a better way to determine when a selective 
disclosure might trigger insider trading liability. Federal courts can return 
to the underlying prohibition against deceptive practices in Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act, the wellspring for the insider trading 
prohibition. Based on this statute, courts could specify several different 
ways—or multiple triggers—in which a selective disclosure could trigger 
insider trading liability.22  
Directly linking the question of when a selective disclosure is 
wrongful to the statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct obviates 
the need to contort a personal benefit test to address an insider trading 
landscape that has significantly changed since the 1983 Dirks decision. 
I.  UNBUNDLING DIRKS 
A careful reading of the Dirks decision is a useful starting point for 
evaluating how courts should determine when a selective disclosure 
should trigger insider trading liability. More specifically, identifying the 
justifications for the Court’s adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks 
is helpful in three ways. First, identifying these various, often competing, 
justifications helps to explain the Dirks opinion’s differing descriptions 
as to what constitutes an impermissible personal benefit. Second, 
identifying these various justifications clarifies the reasons for the 
differences between the Second Circuit opinion in United States v. 
Newman and the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Salman about 
what constitutes a personal benefit, as well as elucidating the reasons for 
the disagreement between the majority and dissent opinions in United 
States v Martoma.23 Finally, identifying and separating out these various 
justifications suggests how best to update the Dirks precedent to reflect 
changes in securities markets disclosure practices and insider trading 
law.24  
  
                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 665 (applying the misappropriation theory); see infra Section II.B. 
 21. See infra Section III.A. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Section I.B. 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
7
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A.  Justifications for a Personal Benefit Test 
One of the central questions addressed in Dirks is when a selective 
disclosure of material nonpublic information may trigger insider trading 
liability.25 The Dirks majority opinion introduced a new test to assist in 
making this determination. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in the majority 
opinion in Dirks, writes that a selective disclosure can only be sufficiently 
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability if “the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”26  
This Section will show that the reasons offered in Dirks for adopting 
a personal benefit test are more complex than is generally recognized.27 
Specifically, four distinct justifications for adopting the personal benefit 
test appear at various points in the Dirks opinion. These are: (1) that 
requiring proof of a personal benefit establishes objective criteria, (2) that 
a personal benefit test allows company executives to continue to make 
selective disclosures for legitimate business purposes, (3) that receipt of 
a personal benefit shows that the person making the selective disclosure 
(the “tipper”) was attempting to circumvent the prohibition against 
insider trading, and (4) that receipt of a personal benefit is a required 
element for finding either that a deception or a fiduciary duty breach has 
occurred. 
In the discussion that follows regarding how the Dirks opinion 
develops each of these justifications for introducing a personal benefit 
test, consideration is given to how well each of these justifications: (1) 
addresses the statutory goal of prohibiting deceptive conduct, and (2) 
matches up with the specifics of the personal benefit test enunciated in 
Dirks.28 
                                                                                                                     
 25. For an identification and discussion of the three distinct legal issues addressed and 
holdings provided in Dirks, see infra Subsection III.B.2. 
 26. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
 27. A few of the notable exceptions are Epstein, supra note 11, at 1504–10, and Macey, 
supra note 5. 
 28. This Article presupposes that Dirks unequivocally holds that the existence of a personal 
benefit is the exclusive basis on which a selective disclosure can be wrongful. Some of the best 
evidence that the Court intends the personal benefit to be a necessary element comes from the 
abbreviation used when specifying the content of the personal benefit test. In discussing the 
personal benefit test, the opinion states, “This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., 
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a 
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” Dirks, 463 U.S. 
at 663. The opinion uses the abbreviation i.e. rather than e.g., implying that only these specific 
types of evidence will suffice. Id.  
However, one could question this assumption. For example, in several places the opinion 
refers to the operative test as being based on whether there was a fiduciary duty breach and not 
exclusively on whether there was a personal benefit. For example, the Dirks opinion emphasizes 
the centrality of evidence of a fiduciary breach in favorably citing Chiarella for the precedent that 
“[t]he tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in 
8
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1.  Objective Criteria 
One justification Dirks offers for requiring a personal benefit element 
to find tipper wrongdoing is that such a requirement guarantees that 
judges and prosecutors can “focus on objective criteria.”29 The Dirks 
opinion notes that relying on objective criteria means that “[i]n 
determining whether the insider’s purpose in making a particular 
disclosure is fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read 
the parties’ minds.”30  
We know from Professor Adam Pritchard’s review of Justice Powell’s 
personal records, which include earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion and 
correspondence between the Justices regarding the Dirks decision, that 
using the personal benefit test to shift the analysis toward questions 
involving objective criteria was the product of a compromise between 
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Powell.31 Pritchard reports that the 
personal benefit test was introduced into the final versions of the Dirks 
opinion at the suggestion of Justice O’Connor.32 Justice O’Connor was 
concerned about the subjectivity involved in trying to determine the 
purpose for which a selective disclosure was made, which Powell’s 
earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion had relied upon as the exclusive means 
to decide when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading 
liability.33 
Pritchard summarized the story of how Justice O’Connor’s concern 
led to the personal benefit test in a 2003 Duke Law Review article: 
 Justice O’Connor’s second concern was more substantial. 
She worried that focusing on the insider’s purpose in 
disclosing the information would require “the fact-
finder . . . to determine the subjective state of mind of the 
                                                                                                                     
the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 230 n.12 (1980) (alteration in original)).  
 29. Id. at 663. 
 30. Id. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Dirks opinion, Langevoort observes that 
the personal benefit test can also provide objective criteria that the recipient of the information 
(the tippee) can observe. Langevoort writes that “the personal benefit requirement is imposed 
because it provides an objective test for determining whether there has been the requisite notice 
to the tippee.” 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:3 n.7. 
 31. See Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 866; Pritchard, supra note 8, at 942. For the 
personal records of Justice Powell, now available online, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, WASH. 
& LEE SCH. L., http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2016). 
 For a discussion of the questionable value of judicial history generally, see Adrian Vermeule, 
Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (1999) (“Nonetheless, that courts have at some times 
and under some circumstances consulted internal materials across all of these domains throws the 
puzzling exclusion of internal judicial history into sharp relief.” (footnote omitted)). 
 32. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 941–42. 
 33. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865–68. 
9
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insider,” “an inherently difficult determination.” She 
suggested omitting the discussion of purpose, a change that 
Powell was not willing to make. More promising was her 
proposed alternative, which looked to 
“whether the insider derives a direct or indirect 
benefit from his disclosure, and that benefit is 
primarily of a pecuniary nature. An emphasis on 
benefit differs from your approach only insofar as 
it establishes a more objective indicia of liability. 
. . .” 
. . . The opinion accordingly was revised to reflect Justice 
O’Connor’s “quite constructive” suggestions.34 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using objective criteria, 
such as evidence of a personal benefit, to determine when a selective 
disclosure is a deceptive practice. One advantage, as the correspondence 
between Justices O’Connor and Powell highlights, is that objective 
criteria remove some of the uncertainty that might otherwise surround a 
determination of whether a selective disclosure was made for an 
inappropriate purpose.35  
There are several disadvantages of using a test based on objective 
criteria to determine when a selective disclosure involves deceptive 
conduct. First, as with any test based on an extrapolation from statutory 
language, there is the likelihood of a mismatch between the objective 
criteria and the underlying language. Take, for example, a selective 
disclosure made for a personal benefit that was nevertheless sanctioned 
by the firm. In this situation, there would be evidence of a personal benefit 
from the selective disclosure, but no underlying deceptive conduct.36 
Second, requiring evidence of objective criteria may also be 
underinclusive, because of situations in which a selective disclosure 
constitutes the kind of deceptive practice that federal securities statutes 
prohibit, but where there is no objective evidence of a personal benefit.37 
As Pritchard observes, “[t]hese changes narrowed the scope of improper 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 941–42 (footnotes omitted). In a more recent article, Pritchard 
published more of the details of the correspondence between Justices O’Connor and Powell 
regarding the inclusion of the personal benefit test in the Dirks opinion. Pritchard on Dirks, supra 
note 5, at 866–67. 
 35. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865–66. 
 36. The possibility of firm-sanctioned selective disclosure raises the more general question 
of why insider trading is illegal when sanctioned by the firm. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, What’s 
the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795, 801 (2015).  
 37. For two specific examples of this under-inclusiveness, see infra Section IV.A. 
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purposes that the SEC could argue constituted breaches of fiduciary duty 
under Rule 10b-5.”38  
The objective criteria justification for adopting the personal benefit 
test also explains some but not all of the description of what constitutes a 
personal benefit in Dirks. For example, the opinion describes the test as 
including either a “direct or indirect personal benefit” and provides as 
examples “pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings.”39 Including the word “indirect” in this sentence could 
raise questions about how attenuated acceptable evidence of objective 
criteria can be, and the ways in which a reputational benefit might 
translate into future earnings are certainly not as easy to objectively 
ascertain as the pecuniary gain test originally proposed by Justice 
O’Connor. Similarly, the Court notes that “a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend” could also evince a personal 
benefit, which further strains an effort to delineate strictly objective 
criteria for identifying an improper purpose, because issues might arise 
about who counts as a friend or relative.40  
 The desire to focus on objective criteria, despite its centrality in the 
judicial history of the Dirks opinion, is but one of several justifications 
for introducing evidence of a personal benefit test as a necessary element 
of wrongful selective disclosure. 
2.  Policy Concerns 
A second justification in the Dirks opinion for requiring evidence of a 
personal benefit is that doing so establishes a test that allows firms to 
continue to make selective disclosures for legitimate business purposes.41  
This second justification, which is a policy consideration aimed at 
protecting the ability of public firms to disseminate information in a 
reasonable and, at times, selective manner, appears twice in the Dirks 
opinion. First, the opinion states that “[i]mposing a duty to disclose or 
abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic 
information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 942. 
 39. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). For the original language Justice O’Connor 
offered in an effort to make the test more objective, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
Justice O’Connor’s original suggestion did include the word “indirect” but also focused on the 
benefit being “primarily of a pecuniary nature.” See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 40. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. For a discussion of the possibility of ambiguity about the 
meaning of these terms, see Brief of the NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 10–12, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 
(2016) (No. 15-628); Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 30 (citing to a SEC report, which found 
that the Court’s opinion in Bateman Eicher clarified “some of the principles underlying Dirks and 
‘removing certain potential ambiguities’”). 
 41. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.  
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influence on the role of market analysts.”42 Later, Justice Powell writes 
that the Court’s failure to establish a clear test for market participants as 
to when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading liability 
“could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which 
the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy 
market.”43 In 1983, the Court could also write with some certainty that 
“[i]t is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets 
themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously 
available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public 
generally.”44 
Weighing the policy ramifications of adopting a particular standard to 
identify wrongdoing is not unusual for the judiciary when undertaking 
statutory interpretation, even if courts might prefer deference to the other 
branches of government when these kinds of policy determinations need 
to be made.45 Moreover, it is particularly apt for a court to weigh the 
policy implications of its decisions when applying the federal securities 
statutes to the insider trading prohibition for two reasons. First, this is an 
area of the law where the underlying statutory language is quite broad.46 
Second, Congress has repeatedly indicated its desire to delegate to federal 
courts the task of filling in the details of when insider trading constitutes 
the type of manipulative or deceptive practice prohibited by the federal 
securities statutes.47 However, there are also a multitude of challenges 
that courts face in making these kinds of policy determinations.48 
3.  Prevent Circumvention 
A third justification in Dirks for adopting a personal benefit test is that 
such a test is necessary to prevent insiders from circumventing the 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 658. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 659.   
 45. But see Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision 
Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 468 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s deference determinations in a 
wide range of constitutional contexts are often inchoate and under-theorized.”). 
 46. See supra note 8. 
 47. For a review of this aspect of the Stock Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) 
Act of 2012, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 34–35. For a review of this aspect of the 
1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act and the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 27–33; Nagy, supra note 10, at 1366–
68; Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. 
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 200–03 (1998); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading 
Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU 
L. REV. 1589, 1616–18 (1999) (providing that “under Central Bank, . . . the courts must infer how 
the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue if Rule 10b-5 had been included as an express 
provision of the 1934 Act”).  
 48. See infra Subsection III.A.2. 
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prohibition against insider trading by indirectly benefiting from activities 
they may not carry out directly.49 In the simplest example, without an 
anti-circumvention prohibition, rather than trade based on inside 
information, an insider could simply sell selective access to material 
nonpublic information and reap a pecuniary gain without actually 
engaging in insider trading.50  
In raising this concern, Justice Powell writes in the Dirks majority 
opinion:  
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they also may not give such information to an 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the 
information for their personal gain.51  
In further support of this anti-circumvention justification for a 
personal benefit test, Justice Powell cites Section 20(b) of the Exchange 
Act, which makes “it unlawful to do indirectly ‘by means of any other 
person’ any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws.”52  
There are two ways to implement the anti-circumvention justification 
for requiring evidence of a personal benefit. One could implement this 
anti-circumvention goal in a narrow way. A narrow implementation 
would prohibit someone making a selective disclosure from receiving 
money from the sale of selective access to material nonpublic 
information. The Dirks opinion offers as a justification for this narrow 
implementation Professor Victor Brudney’s observation “that the insider, 
by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the 
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other 
things of value for himself.”53   
                                                                                                                     
 49. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659, 662. 
 50. See generally Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for 
Corporate Disclosure 12 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
769, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2814125 (arguing that firms should be able to sell the right 
to receive selective disclosures of material nonpublic information: “many firms may in reality be 
fine with allowing their insiders to earn trading profits based on the firm’s information––meaning 
that they are unlikely to police themselves”). 
 51. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 52. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1976)). This anti-circumvention justification for some 
kind of anti-tipping rule also appears in a discussion in Dirks regarding the SEC opinion Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Id. at 654. The Dirks opinion notes that “[t]ipping thus 
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain 
rule.” Id. at 661. 
 53. Id. at 664 (emphasis added) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and 
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348 
(1979)). 
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This narrow implementation of the anti-circumvention objective is 
consistent with the Court’s description of the personal benefit test as 
involving a determination of “whether the insider receives a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or 
a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”54 
An alternative, broader implementation of the anti-circumvention 
objective would prohibit not only selling information, but also providing 
information instead of cash or some other good to a third party. One might 
characterize this as a prohibition on improperly “spending” the benefits 
from insider trading. In this broader implementation there need not be 
any cash or cash-equivalent coming back to the tipper; the tipper may 
receive a benefit from giving the information where she might have 
achieved a similar result by “spending” cash.55 
This broader implementation of the anti-circumvention rationale 
animates at least some of the Court’s formulation of what constitutes a 
personal benefit in Dirks. For example, this broader implementation 
explains why a personal benefit arises “when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade 
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits 
to the recipient.”56 In this situation, rather than generating cash from 
insider trading and using the proceeds, the wrongdoer simply provides 
valuable information in lieu of cash. The end result is the same but 
without the tipper having to buy or sell shares. 
It is noteworthy that while the broader implementation of the anti-
circumvention goal explains why “a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend”57 could constitute a personal benefit, it is not 
self-evident why the broader implementation of the anti-circumvention 
goal should only prohibit tips to these particular people.58 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 663. It should be noted that the Dirks opinion explains this example not as an anti-
circumvention measure, but as a breach of a fiduciary duty. For a discussion of this aspect of the 
justifications for the personal benefit test, see infra Subsection III.A.4. Also, this narrower 
perspective on the personal benefit test is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s suggested language 
for such a test in her correspondence with Justice Powell, stating that the issue should be whether 
“that benefit is primarily of a pecuniary nature.” See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 55. Concern about this broader type of anti-circumvention was mentioned in the Salman 
opinion where Justice Samuel Alito observed: “Making a gift of inside information to a relative 
like Michael is little different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling 
them out to the trading relative.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016). 
 56. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. Note that by including this sentence the opinion appears to 
accept this broader perspective on the anti-circumvention goal, despite the fact that Justice 
O’Connor’s proposed language with respect to the personal benefit test only appears to embrace 
the narrower perspective. See supra note 54. 
 57. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.   
 58. The Court limits the broader implementation of the anti-circumvention goal without 
explanation. Perhaps the Court is implicitly relying on the doctrine in corporate law which treats 
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Whether the personal benefit test is the best way to either narrowly 
(by prohibiting “selling” selective access to material nonpublic 
information) or broadly (by prohibiting “spending” selective access to 
material nonpublic information) prevent circumvention of the insider 
trading prohibition is less clear. One problem with a narrow 
implementation is that such a rule would not treat giving valuable inside 
information to friends and family as a securities law violation, so long as 
no cash remuneration was received in exchange, regardless of whether 
deception occurred. On the other hand, a broad implementation of the 
anti-circumvention goal might outlaw efforts to circumvent the 
prohibition against insider trading, but could render the personal benefit 
test a “nullity.”59 This is because, at the extreme, evidence of a personal 
benefit could be deduced simply from the fact that a person chose to make 
a selective disclosure at all. Even a gift of information to an absolute 
stranger could provide the donor a personal benefit under the broad anti-
circumvention justification, if the tipper might otherwise have given that 
stranger cash that was generated from insider trading.60 
If the goal is to prevent circumvention, then the better approach would 
be to simply follow the common law rule that prohibits any gifting or 
personal use of another’s chattel or land. Professor Richard Epstein 
summarizes the relevant doctrine as follows: “no person is allowed to 
make gifts to his friends of property that is owned by another,”61 and 
argues that the source of this rule can be found in Roman Law, which 
held “that any knowingly unauthorized use of a chattel constituted a form 
of theft.”62 Under such a rule any selective disclosure without consent 
would be prohibited regardless of whether there is evidence that the donor 
received a personal benefit. If the goal is solely to prevent circumvention, 
then there would seem to be no need to check for personal benefit. 
4.  Element of a Fraud or a Fiduciary Breach 
A fourth justification for the personal benefit test in Dirks links 
evidence of a personal benefit directly to the fraud prohibition in the 
                                                                                                                     
certain transactions, such as those between the firm and certain relatives of the firm’s directors, 
as requiring heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2016); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2010).  
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 60. This difficulty was a concern raised by the dissent in Dirks. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676 n.13 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote: “The distinction between pure altruism and 
self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe that courts and 
administrative law judges will have an easier time with it.” Id. 
 61. Epstein, supra note 11, at 1507. 
 62. Id. at 1501. Epstein goes on to make the observation that he does not see why the “the 
analysis ought to change when what passes between parties is not property but information.” Id. 
at 1507.  
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statute. Sprinkled throughout the Dirks opinion, there are quotes drawn 
from earlier insider trading cases that suggest that the presence of a 
personal benefit is a necessary element for finding that insider trading is 
fraudulent.  
For example, the opinion in Dirks includes quotations from two of the 
seminal SEC insider trading opinions, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc.63 and Cady, Roberts & Co.,64 suggesting that receipt of a 
personal benefit is at the heart of the insider trading prohibition.65 In fact, 
the phrase “personal benefit” first appears in Dirks in a quote from the 
1968 SEC Merrill Lynch decision: “In an insider-trading case this fraud 
derives from the ‘inherent unfairness involved where one takes 
advantage’ of ‘information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.’”66  
The Cady, Roberts quotation similarly emphasizes the importance of 
personal gain in making insider trading fraudulent: “[A]n insider will be 
liable under Rule 10b–5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose 
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes 
‘secret profits.’”67 Cady, Roberts also appears in a footnote in Dirks to 
support the proposition that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act 
was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal 
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.”68 
Logically, if a personal benefit is a necessary element to trigger the 
prohibition against insider trading generally, then receipt of a personal 
benefit in exchange for a selective disclosure is fraudulent for the same 
reason that insider trading itself is fraudulent. In this respect, the Court’s 
favorable citation of an article by Professor Michael Dooley for the 
proposition that “inside trading for personal gain is fraudulent, and is a 
violation of the federal securities laws” is highly suggestive.69  
However, it would require a misreading of the cited insider trading 
decisions to conclude that the fraudulent nature of insider trading is solely 
the result of an insider personally benefiting from the use of material 
nonpublic information. For example, in the Merrill Lynch decision cited 
                                                                                                                     
 63. 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). 
 64. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 65. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
 66. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. at 936). 
 67. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 916 n.31). 
 68. Id. at 653 n.10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 
S.E.C. at 912 n.15). It is interesting to observe that even here the Dirks opinion is not claiming 
that deterring personal benefits is the only purpose served by the securities laws. Id. The Court 
writes that this objective was “a” significant purpose, not “the” significant purpose of federal 
securities statutes. Id. 
 69. Id. at 667 n.27 (emphasis added) (citing Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider 
Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–41, 70 (1980)). 
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in Dirks, the SEC held that facilitating unequal access to material 
nonpublic information, and not the existence of a personal benefit, made 
selective disclosure of information a violation of federal securities 
statutes.70 And in Chiarella v. United States,71 decided just three years 
before Dirks, the Supreme Court held that the deception involved in 
insider trading arises from a breach of fiduciary duty, and did not identify 
a personal benefit as a required element in that context.72  
Closely related to the claim that the receipt of a personal benefit makes 
selective disclosure deceptive is the argument that evidence of a personal 
benefit is evidence that there was a breach of a fiduciary duty. Then, in 
turn, following the logic of Chiarella, it is this fiduciary duty breach that 
creates the insider trading violation. Several places in the Dirks opinion 
treat evidence of a personal benefit and of a fiduciary duty breach as 
synonymous. For example, the quote that precedes the introduction of the 
personal benefit test reads: “But to determine whether the disclosure itself 
‘deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]’ shareholders, the initial inquiry 
is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.”73 Elsewhere, 
the Dirks opinion cites Chiarella for the holding that “[t]he tippee’s 
obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.”74 Finally, Dirks 
favorably cites Chiarella for the proposition that a breach of fiduciary 
duty is the main element of an insider trading violation, noting that in 
“determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or 
abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the insider’s ‘tip’ 
constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.”75 
But there are problems with treating evidence of a personal benefit as 
synonymous with a breach of a fiduciary duty and therefore a deceptive 
act. First, there is the doctrinal issue raised in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green76 that even if a personal benefit were synonymous with a fiduciary 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. at 935 (“The advance disclosure of such information to a select 
group who could utilize it for their own benefit, and to the detriment of public investors to whom 
the information was not known, constituted an act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon such investors.”). 
 71. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 72. Id. at 228. One could argue that the Chiarella opinion did not need to mention the 
existence of a personal benefit, since it was a self-evident feature of the insider trading involved 
in that case. 
 73. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980)). 
 74. Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12). Similarly, 
the Court in Dirks observes that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholder of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee.” Id. at 660.  
 75. Id. at 661.  
 76. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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duty breach, it is not necessarily true that every fiduciary duty breach 
involves the type of deception that is prohibited by the federal securities 
statutes.77 Presumably, the implicit argument is that a personal benefit 
reveals a breach of the duty of loyalty, and that a breach of the duty of 
loyalty involves “feigned fidelity” and an act of deception.78 But, as 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge nicely observes, “The question thus arises 
as to which of the various duties to which corporate insiders are subject 
is the relevant one in this context. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once 
again was not very precise on this score.”79  
Perhaps some legitimate basis can be developed for defining when a 
fiduciary breach is deceptive, but there will likely remain some mismatch 
between these criteria and a personal benefit test. As Professor Donald 
Langevoort observes, “If there is one thing clear about the common law 
of fiduciary responsibility, it is that ‘intent to benefit’ is not an essential 
element of a case against the fiduciary.”80 
Differences between a personal benefit and a fiduciary duty breach 
were already clear when Dirks was decided. Justice Harry Blackmun in 
his dissent in Dirks highlights this point with an example from Mosser v. 
Darrow,81 a case also cited by the majority in Dirks.82 Blackmun observes 
that in Mosser the Court did not require a showing of a personal benefit 
received by a fiduciary (nor was there evidence of such a benefit), and 
yet the Court still reached the conclusion that there was not only a breach 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 474–76.  
 78. This link between a personal benefit test and a duty of loyalty is one of the explanations 
Langevoort provides for the Court’s adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks:  
Tipping occurs when an insider passes on information which he knows is 
material and nonpublic to an outsider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to the 
issuer. . . . But by superimposing the personal benefit requirement, the Dirks 
Court seemingly limited the class of breaches that bring into play the abstain or 
disclose requirement to those that are essentially breaches of the “duty of 
loyalty” . . . rather than the “duty of care.” 
18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:6. 
 Nagy also endorses making the link between a breach of the duty of loyalty and the deceptive 
conduct involved in making a selective disclosure explicit, writing: “The Salman Court now has 
the opportunity to advance the law even further by holding explicitly that breaches of loyalty in 
connection with securities trading trigger for tippers a Rule 10b-5 disclosure obligation . . . .” 
Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 51. 
 79. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 50–51 (2014). For 
example, the common law rule that silence by a fiduciary is a deceptive act does not require 
evidence of a personal benefit to reach the conclusion that such silence is deceptive. See Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 228. 
 80. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:5.  
 81. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). 
 82. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
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of a fiduciary duty, but specifically a breach of the duty of loyalty.83  
There are four different justifications the Supreme Court offered when 
it held in Dirks that a selective disclosure by an insider will only trigger 
insider trading liability if “the insider personally will benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from his disclosure.”84 These four distinct justifications match 
somewhat imperfectly with the statutory prohibition against deceptive 
conduct, the personal benefit test enunciated in Dirks, and even with each 
other. 
B.  Newman, Salman, and Martoma 
Unbundling the Dirks opinion’s justifications for requiring evidence 
of a personal benefit to find tipper wrongdoing does much to explain 
differences between the Second Circuit’s application of the personal 
benefit test in United States v. Newman85 and the Ninth Circuit’s 
application of the same test in Salman.86 Understanding the competing 
justifications for adopting the personal benefit test in Dirks also 
illuminates the reasons for the sharp disagreement between the majority 
and dissent in United States v. Martoma87 in determining whether Salman 
justified reconsidering the Newman precedent. These various differences 
arise in large part from an unstated disagreement about which of the four 
justifications offered in Dirks for adopting the personal benefit test should 
be paramount.88 In its brief affirmation of the Salman decision, the 
Supreme Court did nothing to resolve the tensions between these four 
rationales for adopting the personal benefit test.89 
The Newman case involved situations in which an inside source 
passed along selectively disclosed information through several 
intermediaries until the defendants, Anthony Chiasson and Todd 
Newman, used the information to trade for a profit.90 In reversing the 
convictions in Newman, the Second Circuit held that to convict a tippee 
there must be evidence of “a meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain [to the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 675. 
 84. Id. at 662. 
 85. 773 F.3d 438, 442, 448 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 86. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 87. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 88. But see John C. Coffee, Jr., News from California: The 9th Circuit and the SEC 
Challenge New York, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 20, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/ 
2015/07/20/news-from-california-the-9th-circuit-and-the-sec-challenge-new-york/ (“In my 
humble judgment, most (but possibly not all) Second Circuit panels would have reached the same 
outcome as did the Ninth Circuit in Salman . . . .”). 
 89. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). The opinion is only seven pages long. 
 90. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
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nature.”91 Only under these circumstances, according to the Newman 
panel, can a selective disclosure be equivalent to “trading by the insider 
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”92 The Second 
Circuit opinion in Newman relies primarily on the role the personal 
benefit test can play in providing objective criteria for determining when 
a selective disclosure is wrongful.93  
The Newman court, in its effort to ensure that judges and prosecutors 
can rely on objective criteria, is unwilling to accept an interpretation of 
the personal benefit test that edges away from a focus on objective 
evidence.94 In a recent article, Pritchard argues that the interpretation of 
the personal benefit test by the Newman panel correctly interprets the 
Dirks personal benefit test.95 But Pritchard’s reading of the Dirks 
precedent may be unduly influenced by his familiarity with the judicial 
history surrounding the inclusion of the personal benefit test in Dirks. As 
Pritchard first uncovered, the personal benefit test was included in the 
final drafts of the Dirks opinion to address Justice O’Connor’s concern 
about the lack of objective criteria for determining when a selective 
disclosure is wrongful.96 But, as discussed above, the evidence in its 
entirety does not support the conclusion that establishing objective 
criteria was the sole reason for the adoption of the personal benefit 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 452.  
 92. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)). 
 93. This focus on the objective criteria justification is evident from the sections of the Dirks 
opinion that the Second Circuit opinion in Newman chooses to cite. See, e.g., Newman, 773 F.3d 
at 450 (“But a breach of the duty of confidentiality is not fraudulent unless the tipper acts for 
personal benefit, that is to say, there is no breach unless the tipper ‘is in effect selling the 
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for 
himself . . . .’” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)). 
Conversely, the Second Circuit opinion in Newman does not cite the language in the Dirks 
opinion characterizing the personal benefit test in ways more influenced by alternative 
justifications, such as the statement that wrongful selective disclosure occurs when an insider 
makes a “gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 94. Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–53. 
 95. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 874 (“Newman’s interpretation of personal benefit 
is consistent with, if not compelled by, Powell’s purpose in Dirks.”); see also Stephen Bainbridge, 
US v. Newman: A Big Win for Coherence and Fairness in Insider Trading Law, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec. 11, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2014/12/us-v-newman-a-big-win-for-coherence-and-fairness-in-
insider-trading-law.html (“Yesterday, the Second Circuit did the right thing and reversed the 
convictions . . . .”); Coffee, supra note 87 (“Understandably, the Second Circuit found this 
professional courtesy to be insufficient to amount to the requisite ‘personal benefit.’”). But see 
Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 6 (“My own views coincide with those of scholars including 
Professors Michael Perino, Jay Brown, and James Cox, who each regard Newman as a blatant 
misapplication of Dirks . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 96. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
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requirement.97 
In the Salman case, investment banker Maher Kara repeatedly passed 
confidential information garnered through his position at Citigroup to his 
brother, Michael Kara, who, in turn, passed the information along to 
Bassam Salman, who traded using this information.98 The Ninth Circuit 
Salman opinion emphasizes the statement in Dirks that the “exploitation 
of nonpublic information also exist[s] when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”99 For the Ninth 
Circuit in Salman, therefore, it is a simple matter to conclude that passing 
information from one brother to another created a personal benefit for the 
tipper, in this case Maher, even without evidence of “a potential gain of 
a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”100 As discussed above, the 
source of the presumption of a personal benefit when a gift is made to a 
“trading friend or relative” was concern about using a tip to circumvent 
the insider trading prohibition.101 
Thus, it is ambiguity in Dirks about why to require evidence of a 
personal benefit—and the differing characterizations throughout the 
Dirks opinion as to what constitutes a personal benefit—that best explains 
the Circuit split regarding what is needed to establish receipt of a personal 
benefit.102 The Newman panel focuses on the language in the Dirks 
opinion emphasizing the importance of establishing objective criteria,103 
while the Salman panel focuses on language in the Dirks opinion 
preventing tip use to circumvent the insider trading prohibition.104 
  
                                                                                                                     
 97. See supra Section I.A. For example, it is hard to reconcile the Newman panel’s 
statement of the personal benefit test requiring “a meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain [to 
the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452, with the 
statement in Dirks that a personal benefit results “when an insider makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 98. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 99. Id. at 1092 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). 
 100. Id. at 1093 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). The Ninth Circuit 
Salman opinion also notes the holding in Newman that evidence of a personal benefit requires 
finding a “meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” 
and concludes that “[t]o the extent Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
 101. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 102. For a prescient discussion of uncertainty about what might constitute a sufficient 
personal benefit to trigger liability under Dirks, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: 
Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 23, 24. 
 103. See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
 104. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
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In affirming Salman and rejecting at least part of Newman, the 
Supreme Court did little to resolve this ambiguity in Dirks.105 The 
Supreme Court opinion did recognize the anti-circumvention goal of 
prohibiting gifts to friends or relative, observing that: “In such situations, 
the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information 
is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the 
proceeds.”106 But the larger tensions inherent in the personal benefit test 
were entirely ignored. This unwillingness in the Supreme Court’s Salman 
opinion to address doctrinal confusion regarding the link between 
selective disclosure and the insider trading prohibition is problematic 
given how much has changed in the regulation of selective disclosure and 
insider trading since Dirks was decided. 
The Martoma case involved an appeal from an insider trading 
conviction entered in September 2014.107 In the original case the 
defendant, Mathew Martoma, was convicted based on a claim that he was 
a tippee who knew that the tipper, Dr. Sidney Gilman, from whom he 
received material nonpublic information, received a personal benefit in 
exchange for providing the information. Martoma’s appeal of that 
conviction was initially based on the holding in Newman and then was 
reheard to address the Supreme Court subsequent decision in Salman. 
The majority in Martoma upheld the original insider trading 
conviction. In doing so, the majority held “that Salman fundamentally 
altered the analysis underlying Newman’s ‘meaningfully close personal 
relationship’ requirement such that the ‘meaningfully close personal 
relationship’ requirement is no longer good law.”108 To reach this 
conclusion, the majority in Martoma repeatedly noted and observed that 
the Salman opinion specifically mentioned the extent which “making a 
gift of insider information to a relative . . . is little different from trading 
on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out.”109 The 
Martoma court’s rejection of Newman was almost exclusively based on 
its acceptance of preventing circumvention as the primary and seemingly 
exclusive goal of the personal benefit test in Dirks.110  
  
                                                                                                                     
 105. In the Salman opinion, the Supreme Court specifically rejects the Newman panel’s 
statement of the personal benefit test as requiring “a meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain [to 
the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 
428 (2016) (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 106. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428. 
 107. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 108. Id. at 69. 
 109. Id. at 69 (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428). 
 110. See supra Subsection I.A.3. for a discussion of the goal of preventing circumvention of 
the insider trading prohibition as a justification for the Dirks’ personal benefit test. 
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On the other hand, the dissent in Martoma emphasizes other 
justifications that appear in Dirks for adopting a personal benefit test, and 
in doing so reaches the opposite conclusion about whether the Newman 
precedent should be reversed based on the holding in Salman. The dissent 
in Martoma emphasizes the role that the personal benefit test plays in 
providing objective facts to determine whether the selective disclosure 
was wrongful.111 The dissenting opinion observes that “[w]ithout the 
personal benefit rule, many insider-trading cases would require the 
government to show few objective facts,”112 and concludes that the 
Newman restatement of the Dirks personal benefit test was an appropriate 
way to achieve the underlying objective of keeping the focus on objective 
facts. 
Confusion in the Dirks opinion about why to require evidence of a 
personal benefit thus continues to feed disagreement and uncertainty 
about how to determine when a selective disclosure is sufficiently 
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability. 
II.  CHANGES SINCE DIRKS 
Two developments in particular have fundamentally altered the 
relationship between selective disclosure and the prohibition against 
insider trading since Dirks was decided in 1983. First, with the enactment 
of Regulation FD by the SEC in 2000, selective disclosure by public 
companies moved from being a practice largely shaped by federal 
common law to being a practice controlled by administrative 
rulemaking.113 Second, the acceptance by the Court of the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan 
appropriately expanded the types of conduct that might trigger insider 
trading liability to include not only deceptive practices in impersonal 
trading markets, but also conduct that deceives the source from 
which material nonpublic information is misappropriated.114 These 
developments are discussed in further detail below. 
A.  Enactment of Regulation FD 
With the enactment of Regulation FD in 2000 the SEC put in place 
disclosure requirements that regulated the selective disclosure practices 
of public companies.115 The essence of Regulation FD is the requirement 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See supra Subsection I.A.1. for a discussion of the goal of establishing objective criteria 
in the Dirks’ personal benefit test. 
 112. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 113. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2014). 
 114. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).  
 115. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. For an overview of Regulation FD, see Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: 
An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
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that: 
[w]henever [a public company], or any person acting on its 
behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information 
regarding that [company] or its securities to any person [who 
is a market professional or might buy or sell company 
shares], the [company] shall make public disclosure of that 
information [that is reasonably designed to provide broad, 
non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the 
public] . . . .116  
Several considerations informed the SEC decision to engage in this 
new mode of disclosure regulation. First, the declining cost of 
information dissemination made it possible for public companies to 
regularly disclose information simultaneously to as wide an audience as 
desired.117 Second, the SEC viewed the selective disclosure of material 
nonpublic information as inconsistent with ordinary investors’ concept of 
what constituted fair play in securities markets.118 As the introductory 
paragraph of Regulation FD’s Proposing Release stated, the “proposals 
are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of information by 
issuers.”119 The Proposing Release goes on to explain that “we do not 
believe that allowing issuers to disclose material information selectively 
to analysts is in the best interests of investors or the securities markets 
generally. Instead, to the maximum extent practicable, we believe that all 
investors should have access to an issuer’s material disclosures at the 
same time.”120 
In regulating the selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information with Regulation FD, the SEC limited the scope of the 
prohibition against selective disclosure in several ways to minimize 
unwelcome side effects. First, the rule recognized the possibility of an 
inadvertent selective disclosure of material nonpublic information, and 
                                                                                                                     
INSIDER TRADING 112, 112–14 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). For recent articles questioning 
the optimality of Regulation FD, see Epstein, supra note 11, at 1507; Kevin S. Haeberle & M. 
Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving 
Information Is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1385–86 (2016); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Regulation FD in the Age of Facebook and Twitter: Should the SEC Sue Netflix? 7 (Rock Ctr. for 
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 131, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2209525. 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a). 
 117. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec. 
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103). 
 118. Id. at 72,592. 
 119. Id. at 72,590. 
 120. Id. at 72,591. 
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included a provision that explained how to respond if this happened.121 
Second, the SEC included a provision that prevented investors from 
bringing a private right of action against a public company for that 
company’s failure to comply with Regulation FD.122 Third, Regulation 
FD only applies its prohibition to senior officials of the firm or others in 
the firm who regularly communicate with outside investors, and only 
prohibits making selective disclosures to those who are likely to use the 
information for securities trading.123 Finally, Regulation FD excludes 
from its coverage insiders who selectively disclose material nonpublic 
information “in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer,” 
presumably so that issuers do not face liability for violations carried out 
by rouge employees.124  
Bringing the enactment of Regulation FD in to a discussion about 
insider trading jurisprudence can lead to an objection that the SEC 
designed Regulation FD to avoid influencing determinations about what 
constitutes insider trading.125 This objection usually stems from Rule 102 
of Regulation FD, which states that “[n]o failure to make a public 
disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a 
violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . under the Securities Exchange Act.”126 
Pritchard, for example, writes in reference to this Rule 102 of Regulation 
FD that: “Notably, Regulation FD was adopted by the SEC pursuant to 
its authority to regulate disclosures by public companies. The rule 
specifically disclaims defining selective disclosure as fraudulent. This is 
by necessity; under Dirks’ personal benefit standard, simple breaches of 
confidentiality are not deceptive.”127 
But a careful review of the details of Section 102 of Regulation FD 
shows that it is a mistake to conclude that Regulation FD was designed 
to be kept separate from insider trading jurisprudence. It is more likely 
that Section 102 was included to insulate public companies from 
                                                                                                                     
 121. 17 C.F.R. 243.100(a)(2) (“Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”); SEC 
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2014) (defining the word “promptly” in the context of 
this rule). 
 122. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2014). For further discussion of this 
provision, see infra notes 125–21 and accompanying text. 
 123. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(b)(1), 243.101(c). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c). 
 125. Some courts may implicitly accept this argument. See generally United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (an insider trading case decided after Regulation FD was 
adopted that never mentions Regulation FD). 
 126. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102. 
 127. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 870 (footnote omitted); see also Epstein, supra note 
11, at 1511 (“Regulation FD flies in the face of Dirks, which stated the exact opposite conclusion 
with respect to communications between analysts and insiders.”); Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 
5, at 40 n.304 (discussing Larry E. Ribstein and other authors’ concerns about Regulation FD as 
an unwarranted intrusion into insider trading regulation). 
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shareholders who might want to bring private rights of action based on 
Regulation FD violations.  
Some statements in the Proposing Release of Regulation FD do 
suggest that the SEC intended the effects of Regulation FD to be excluded 
when considering issues related to insider trading liability. For example, 
the Proposing Release states that: 
The approach we propose does not treat selective 
disclosure as a type of fraudulent conduct or revisit the 
insider trading issues addressed in Dirks. Rather, we propose 
to use our authority to require full and fair disclosure from 
issuers, primarily under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 
as a basis for proposed Regulation FD.128 
However, there are direct statements in both the Proposing Release 
and the Final Rule Release explaining that Rule 102 was included in 
Regulation FD solely to prevent public company shareholders from 
bringing a private right of action based on purported violations of 
Regulation FD. For example, the Final Rule Release explains that “to 
remove any doubt that private liability will not result from a Regulation 
FD violation, we have revised Regulation FD to make absolutely clear 
that it does not establish a duty for purposes of Rule 10b-5 under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’).”129 
Similarly, the discussion issued along with the Final Rule Release 
observes that: 
[W]e are mindful of the concerns about chilling issuer 
disclosure; we agree that the market is best served by more, 
not less, disclosure of information by issuers. Because any 
potential ‘chill’ is most likely to arise—if at all—from the 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,594 (Dec. 28, 1999) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249). In a similar vein: “In addition, Regulation FD does 
not affect or undermine any existing bases of liability under Rule 10b-5. Thus, for example, 
liability for ‘tipping’ under Rule 10b-5 may still exist if a selective disclosure is made in 
circumstances that meet the Dirks ‘personal benefit’ test.” Id. at 72,598. 
 129. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
Regulation FD is an issuer disclosure rule that is designed to create duties 
only under Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act and Section 30 of the 
Investment Company Act. It is not an antifraud rule, and unlike other Section 
13(a) and 15(d) reporting requirements, it is not intended to create duties under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or any other provision of the federal securities 
laws. As a result, no private liability will arise from an issuer’s failure to file or 
make public disclosure.  
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,598 (emphasis added). 
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fear of legal liability, we included in proposed Regulation 
FD significant safeguards against inappropriate liability.130  
The exclusive goal of eliminating a private right of action for 
violations of Regulation FD is also consistent with the actual text of Rule 
102. Rule 102 only mentions Rule 10b-5, not Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act.131 Rule 10b-5 is the rule under which federal courts have 
established the private right of action under federal securities statutes, 
whereas Section 10(b) (which is not excluded by Rule 102) provides the 
basis for the prosecution of a deceptive or manipulative practice in 
violation of federal securities rules or regulations generally.132  
The enactment of Regulation FD has had a wide-ranging impact on 
public company practices and policies with respect to the selective 
disclosure of material nonpublic information. Professor Jill Fisch, in a 
recent discussion of the research on the effects of Regulation FD, reports 
that: “There is substantial evidence that Regulation FD reduced selective 
disclosure and information asymmetries.”133 Regulation FD has also 
affected employee policies at public companies. Virtually all public 
companies now have employee policies that prohibit any unauthorized 
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information.134 The adoption 
of a prohibition against any kind of employee selective disclosure also 
appears to have spread to firms that advise or work with public firms.135  
B.  United States v. O’Hagan 
The 1997 Supreme Court decision in United States v. O’Hagan136 is 
the second development since Dirks that has fundamentally altered the 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718. 
 131. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2014) (“No failure to make a public 
disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . under 
the Securities Exchange Act.”). 
 132. For a discussion of Section 10(b) and its relationship to Rule 10b-5, see generally Steve 
Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1 (“Rule 10b-5 does not implement section 10(b); section 10(b) implements Rule 10b-5.”). 
 133. Fisch, supra note 115, at 125 (footnote omitted). 
 134. At least for Delaware corporations and other jurisdictions that follow the In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation precedent, failure to put in place a system to 
ensure compliance with Regulation FD would constitute a breach of director fiduciary duty. In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). In the Proposing 
Release, the SEC stated: “[W]e expect that most issuers will consider implementing appropriate 
disclosure policies to guard against selective disclosure.” Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,598 n.57; see also Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 40 
(“Moreover, virtually all publicly traded companies now have stringent policies and procedures 
in place to guard against Regulation FD violations.”).  
 135. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 1497. 
 136. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
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landscape for determining when a selective disclosure is wrongful. 
O’Hagan involved a lawyer, James Herman O’Hagan, who used material 
nonpublic information about an upcoming tender offer to trade for a profit 
in Pillsbury Company securities.137 O’Hagan did not gain access to 
information about the upcoming tender offer because he was an insider 
of Pillsbury.138 Rather, O’Hagan received the information about the 
tender offer from the law firm he worked at, Dorsey & Whitney, which 
represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”), the company that 
initiated the tender offer for Pillsbury.139 
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan held that “criminal liability under 
§ 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.”140 “The 
‘misappropriation theory’ holds that a person commits fraud ‘in 
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for 
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”141 
The misappropriation theory represents an important extension of the 
prohibition against insider trading. Prior to the decision in O’Hagan, the 
only locus for deception that the Supreme Court had affirmed could lead 
to an insider trading violation were transactions involving the actual 
purchase or sale of securities.142 Because these transactions typically 
occur on impersonal securities markets, there is unlikely to be 
communication between the person possessing the material nonpublic 
information and the person who is on the other side of the transaction. As 
a result, prior to O’Hagan, the only type of deceptive conduct that could 
trigger insider trading liability on a public securities exchange was 
silence.  
With O’Hagan, the Court recognized a second locus for deception that 
could lead to insider trading liability, namely dealings between the 
misappropriator and the source of the information.143 The types of 
deceptive conduct that a misappropriator might engage in when taking 
information from the source are far more numerous than the silence that 
constitutes the only type of deception that can take place on an impersonal 
securities market.144 As but one simple example, the misappropriator 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. at 647.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 650.   
 141. Id. at 652.  
 142. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650–51 (1983). 
 143. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.  
 144. Professor Gregory Klass recently observed the importance of distinguishing different 
ways in which deception might be carried out. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in 
the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449 (2012). Of particular interest is the contrast Klass draws 
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might make an affirmative misrepresentation in order to gain access to a 
company’s material nonpublic information.  
Three additional aspects of the O’Hagan decision are noteworthy 
when evaluating how the holding in this case compels an updating of our 
understanding of the relationship between selective disclosure and insider 
trading. First, the Court in O’Hagan is unwavering in its conclusion that 
the “in connection with” language in the statute does not require that the 
deceptive conduct occur only when and where securities are traded.145 
The opinion observes, for example, that “[t]he statute thus proscribes (1) 
using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities, in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission. The 
provision, as written, does not confine its coverage to deception of a 
purchaser or seller of securities.”146  
Second, the O’Hagan opinion does not directly address how the 
misappropriation theory might alter the determination of when a selective 
disclosure should trigger insider trading liability. There is no discussion 
in O’Hagan, for example, of how to evaluate a chain of events where 
there is first a misappropriation of material nonpublic information, and 
then a selective disclosure of that misappropriated information, and 
finally a trade based upon that selective disclosure.  After O’Hagan, an 
open question therefore remains as to whether or how the “in connection 
with” language would apply to a scenario combining misappropriation 
and tipping. Lower courts are split on how to evaluate this chain of 
events.147 The Supreme Court in Salman explicitly declined to address 
                                                                                                                     
between deception by action and deception by silence. According to Klass the test for a deceptive 
act carried out by action is relatively simple, whereas the test that needs to be applied when a 
deception is carried out by inaction is necessarily a more nuanced test. Klass observes that “there 
is a deep error in the common law tendency to conflate fraud by misrepresentation, fraud by 
concealment, and fraud by nondisclosure, which in fact involve different regulatory approaches 
and therefore require attention to different aspects of a transaction.” Id. at 450. 
 145. Id. at 656.   
 146. Id. at 651. 
 147. The majority view expressed, for example, in United States v. Newman, appears to be 
that the personal benefit test is an added element to find wrongdoing if the person who 
misappropriated the information did not trade on the information directly but instead chose to 
selectively disclose the misappropriated information. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 
F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The elements of tipping liability are the same, regardless of 
whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’ theory.” (citing 
SEC v. Obus, 693 F. 3d 276, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2012))), and SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–80 
(11th Cir. 2003) (applying the personal benefit test to misappropriating tipper), with SEC v. 
Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The misappropriation theory of liability 
does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper . . . .”), and United States v. Whitman, 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Thus, the tippee’s knowledge that disclosure of the insider 
information was unauthorized is sufficient for liability in a misappropriation case.”). 
29
Guttentag: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
548 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
 
this issue.148 
Third, the O’Hagan opinion does not consider whether the only type 
of deceptive conduct that could trigger misappropriation insider trading 
liability is the breach of a fiduciary duty.149 This ambiguity in O’Hagan 
                                                                                                                     
There are reasonable arguments on both sides of this divide. For example, some argue that to 
exclude the personal benefit test requirement in misappropriation insider trading cases would 
allow prosecutors to avoid the personal benefit test altogether by always charging classical insider 
trading cases as misappropriation cases instead. See, e.g., 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 6:13 
(“To allow a prosecutor or plaintiff to avoid the impact of the personal benefit approach simply 
by pleading the misappropriation theory would in effect operate to overrule the Dirks decision, a 
questionable step absent legislative reform.”).  
Others argue that selective disclosures involving the misappropriation theory should be 
evaluated differently, because the elements necessary to determine if a misappropriation has 
occurred are different from those required to determine if classical insider trading has occurred. 
See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 
197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984). As the Department of Justice observed:  
The distinct duties underlying the classical and misappropriation theories 
give rise to different types of breaches of those duties . . . . 
. . . A misappropriation case requires no showing of a personal benefit to the 
tipper, because the breach is inherent in the tipper’s theft of confidential 
information. The theft alone, in violation of the source of information’s property 
right to the information, is a breach of the person’s duty to the source of the 
information. 
Plaintiff SEC’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 
558 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14-CV-04644-JSR), 2015 WL 3799400; see also Merritt B. Fox & 
George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has No Place in Misappropriation Tipping 
Cases, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 25, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/ 2017/07/25/ 
insider-trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-in-misappropriation-tipping-cases/.  
A straightforward reading of Dirks will not resolve this dispute. The sentence that best 
summarizes its test for tipper/tippee liability reads:  
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to 
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). This statement assumes that there is only one reason 
selective disclosure by an insider can lead to an insider trading violation: a breach of a “fiduciary 
duty to the shareholder.” Id. Therefore, Dirks is silent as to whether to apply the personal benefit 
test when the relevant breach of fiduciary duty is owed to a party other than the firm’s 
shareholders.  
 148. 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016). 
 149. O’Hagan refers to the crucial test as involving whether there was deception as often as 
it refers to the crucial test as involving whether there was a breach of a fiduciary duty. Compare 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception . . . .”), with id. 
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is not surprising: the Court was addressing a situation where the 
misappropriator’s deceptive conduct involved a breach of a fiduciary 
duty, so a discussion about other types of deceptive conduct was not 
germane to the decision.150  
The question left open by O’Hagan, whether only a breach of a 
fiduciary duty or some other types of deceptive conduct as well might 
constitute misappropriation, is the converse of the issue the Court 
addressed in Santa Fe Industries, Inc., v. Green.151 In Santa Fe the Court 
held that as long as an investor’s “choice was fairly presented, and 
[investors] were furnished with all relevant information on which to base 
their decision,” then a fiduciary duty breach would not involve the type 
of deceptive conduct necessary to trigger Section 10(b) liability.152 The 
question here is not whether there can be a fiduciary duty breach without 
deception (the issue in Santa Fe), but whether there can be deception 
without a fiduciary duty breach. 
The possibility of a situation where there is misappropriation and 
deception but no fiduciary breach is not just a theoretical curiosity. SEC 
v. Dorozhko153 raised precisely this issue. In that case, a computer hacker, 
Oleksandr Dorozhko, allegedly hacked into the computers of Thomson 
Financial, Inc. to access material nonpublic information about a 
forthcoming earnings announcement from IMS Health, Inc., a public 
company.154 Dorozhko, a resident of Ukraine, had no fiduciary 
relationship with either Thomson Financial or IMS Health.155 Dorozhko, 
therefore, could not have breached a fiduciary duty either to the source 
from which he misappropriated the information or to the company the 
information was about.156 Yet he still might have gained access to 
information about the forthcoming IMS Health earnings report through 
deceptive conduct, depending on the details of how he hacked into the 
Thomson Financial computers.157  
In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit held that Dorozhko’s deceptive 
conduct could trigger insider trading liability under the misappropriation 
                                                                                                                     
at 652 (“[T]he misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception 
of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”).  
 150. Id. at 647. For that matter, nor would a discussion of tipper liability be relevant to the 
particular facts of O’Hagan, where there was no tipping involved. 
 151. 430 U.S. 462, 473–75 (1977).  
 152. Id. at 474. 
 153. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 154. Id. at 44.  
 155. Id. at 44–45.  
 156. Id. at 45.  
 157. Id. at 44 (providing that “an anonymous computer hacker attempted to gain access to 
the IMS earnings report by hacking into a secure server at Thomson prior to the report’s official 
release”).  
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theory, even though he did not have a fiduciary relationship with the 
source of the information.158 The Dorozhko court concluded: 
Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford all stand for the 
proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty 
“satisfies § 10(b)’s requirement . . . [of] a ‘deceptive device 
or contrivance.’’’ However, what is sufficient is not always 
what is necessary . . . . 
In this case . . . the SEC argues that defendant 
affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access 
to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to 
trade. We are aware of no precedent of the Supreme Court 
or our Court that forecloses or prohibits the SEC’s 
straightforward theory of fraud. Absent a controlling 
precedent that ‘‘deceptive’’ has a more limited meaning than 
its ordinary meaning, we see no reason to complicate the 
enforcement of Section 10(b) by divining new 
requirements.159 
Langevoort, for one, agrees with the Dorozhko panel’s conclusion that 
deceptive conduct need not involve a breach of a fiduciary duty, writing 
that:  
If one accepts the court’s characterization of hacking, we 
have real deception here, and do not need to resort to 
constructive fraud. Rather this poses the opposite question: 
is there any reason to consider the two fiduciary-based 
theories exclusive statements of insider trading’s scope? The 
Second Circuit could think of no good reason to, and neither 
can I.160 
The Dorozhko holding suggests that O’Hagan may not limit 
misappropriation insider trading violations to deceptive conduct arising 
from a fiduciary duty breach, but Dorozhko does not address how this 
conclusion affects our understanding of the relationship between 
selective disclosure and insider trading. The important question left 
unanswered by Dorozhko and O’Hagan is how to evaluate a selective 
disclosure when the original misappropriation involves deceptive 
conduct other than the breach of a fiduciary duty. Suppose, for example, 
that rather than trade himself Dorozhko had sold the information he 
misappropriated from Thomson Financial to a third party for that third 
party to use for securities trading. What role, if any, a personal benefit 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 51.  
 159. Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 160. Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider 
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 459. 
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test would play in this context is unclear. 
In 1997, the acceptance of the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading in O’Hagan expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could 
trigger insider trading liability to include deceiving the source of that 
information. In 2000, the enactment of Regulation FD moved the 
regulation of selective disclosure from federal courts to the SEC and 
prohibited public firms from selectively disclosing material nonpublic 
information to Wall Street analysts.161 For the reasons detailed below, 
both of these developments have fundamentally altered the calculus of 
how to determine when a selective disclosure should trigger insider 
trading liability. 
III.  THE DEMISE OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST 
After the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision, it is 
logical to ask to what extent the various justifications the Court relied on 
for adopting the personal benefit test in Dirks continue to support 
requiring evidence of a personal benefit to find that a selective disclosure 
is sufficiently wrongful to trigger insider trading liability. 
A.  Justifications for the Personal Benefit Test Reconsidered  
The four justifications that appear in Dirks for adopting the personal 
benefit test are: (1) establishing objective criteria, (2) insulating 
legitimate corporate communications from liability, (3) preventing 
circumvention of the insider trading prohibition, and (4) identifying when 
a sufficiently serious fiduciary duty breach has occurred.162  
In light of the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision, 
these justifications no longer provide support for making evidence of a 
personal benefit a necessary requirement for proving tipper wrongdoing. 
First, if the goal of the personal benefit test is to provide objective criteria, 
then the more reliable approach in today’s securities markets would be to 
adopt a rebuttable presumption that repeated selective access to material 
nonpublic information indicates that deceptive conduct is occurring.163 
Second, federal courts no longer need to create a common law rule to 
protect legitimate public company selective disclosure practices, because 
with the advent of Regulation FD such disclosures are now prohibited.164 
                                                                                                                     
 161. See supra Section II.A. 
 162. See supra Section I.A. 
 163. See infra Subsection III.A.1. 
 164. See infra Subsection III.A.2. For a similar observation, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra 
note 5, at 42 (“Regulation FD leaves corporate insiders, particularly those in investor relations or 
finance departments, with little room for a credible claim that selective disclosures about earnings 
information were prompted by a mistaken belief about whether it ‘already has been disclosed or 
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Third, if the goal of the personal benefit test is to prevent people from 
using selective disclosures to circumvent the prohibition against insider 
trading, then the common law rule prohibiting any sharing of chattel or 
land that belongs to another is the more appropriate model to follow.165 
Finally, evidence of deceptive conduct no longer needs to hinge 
exclusively on whether someone receives a personal benefit.166 For these 
reasons, as detailed below, after the enactment of Regulation FD and the 
O’Hagan decision, it no longer makes sense to try to shoehorn the various 
rationales offered in Dirks for prohibiting some types of selective 
disclosures into a personal benefit test. 
1.  Objective Criteria 
One justification offered in Dirks for requiring evidence of a personal 
benefit is that such a test allows judges and prosecutors to focus on 
objective criteria.167 This objective criteria justification remains the most 
plausible reason for continuing to require evidence of a personal benefit, 
despite the changes highlighted above since the 1983 Dirks decision. 
There are, however, countervailing considerations that suggest, 
particularly after the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan 
decision, that there are now better ways to establish objective criteria of 
tipper wrongdoing for judges and prosecutors.168 Courts could adopt a 
rebuttable presumption that the repeated selective disclosure of material 
nonpublic information about a public company is evidence that the 
information is being disclosed deceptively.169  
Such a presumption would have made little sense in 1983 when Dirks 
was decided, because the repeated selective disclosure of public company 
material nonpublic information appears to have been a common 
                                                                                                                     
that it is not material enough to affect the market.’” (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 
(1983))). 
 165. See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
 166. See infra Subsection III.A.4. 
 167. See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
 168. Also, it is helpful to note that establishing objective criteria for determining tipper 
wrongdoing was never the exclusive justification for requiring evidence of a personal benefit. If 
establishing objective criteria is the only goal, then a rule establishing no liability or strict liability 
is a simpler solution. The goal of establishing objective criteria is necessarily a second-order 
consideration when attempting to implement the statutory purpose of prohibiting deceptive 
conduct. 
 169. Since only repeated practice may trigger this presumption, it is unlikely to come into 
play when selective disclosure is not intentional. For the basis of this observation, see Nagy, 
Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 46.  
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practice.170 But it is hard to imagine today circumstances where the 
repeated selective disclosure of material nonpublic information would be 
acceptable. In almost all situations, systematic selective disclosure would 
violate both Regulation FD and company policy.171 In this new 
environment, the rebuttable presumption establishes an objective 
standard that reflects the extent to which the dividing line between what 
constitutes an acceptable and unacceptable selective disclosure has 
shifted since Dirks was decided in 1983.  
Another reason to doubt that a personal benefit test will deliver the 
objective certainty sought by the Dirks Court is the judicial experience in 
trying to apply the personal benefit test over the last thirty-plus years.172 
This is in part due to the inherently ambiguous nature of determining what 
does or does not constitute a personal benefit. Applying the personal 
benefit test, at least as delineated in Dirks, raises difficult issues in 
application that may have been unforeseen in 1983.173 
Both changed practices and thirty-five years of experience suggest 
that requiring evidence of a personal benefit is no longer a particularly 
useful tool for providing judges and prosecutors objective evidence of 
tipper wrongdoing. 
                                                                                                                     
 170. In Dirks, for example, the Court noted that it was not only common practice for public 
companies to selectively disclose information to certain investors, especially Wall Street analysts, 
but also the SEC welcomed and even encouraged this practice: 
All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with 
the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of 
this case, the more typical situation . . . is when insiders disclose information to 
analysts. In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary 
duty to shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market. 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1983) (citation omitted).  
The Dirks opinion goes on to suggest in an example that selective disclosures would, in fact, 
only be acceptable if they were inadvertent, stating that, “[f]or example, it may not be clear—
either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst—whether the information will be viewed 
as material nonpublic information.” Id. at 662. This example, however, is essentially a non-
sequitur. For an article justifying on economic terms the selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information to Wall Street analysts, see generally Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosure in the 
Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 540 (2002).   
 171. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 172. For a review of the difficulty courts have had in applying the personal benefit test, see 
Brief of the NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 40, at 6–13. 
 173. But see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between 
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe 
that courts and administrative law judges will have an easier time with it.”). It also may be true 
that unequivocal acceptance of a formulation of the personal benefit test in a manner designed 
more directly to establish objective criteria, such as one requiring evidence of a pecuniary gain, 
could minimize some of these difficulties. 
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2.  Policy Concerns 
The second Dirks justification for requiring evidence of a personal 
benefit is that such a requirement represented the Court’s best effort in 
1983 to balance policy considerations.174 The relevant policy 
considerations the Court identified in Dirks were, on the one hand, 
allowing the government to prosecute deceptive practices versus, on the 
other hand, allowing firms to selectively disseminate material nonpublic 
information to investors without fear of criminal prosecution.175 But these 
policy concerns no longer justify requiring evidence of a personal benefit 
to determine when a selective disclosure constitutes a deceptive practice. 
In 1983, when Dirks was decided, public firms may have had a 
legitimate interest in facilitating ongoing selective disclosures to certain 
market participants.176 But public companies no longer have a legitimate 
interest in making these types of selective disclosures because of the 
enactment of Regulation FD.177 More generally, after the enactment of 
Regulation FD, there is less of a need for federal judges to establish 
common law rules that balance policy interests in the context of the 
selective disclosure practices of public companies. This is now a practice 
governed by administrative rule-making. 
The personal benefit test may have assisted courts in distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate selective disclosures, but there is no 
longer a need for a common law rule protecting this demarcation. 
3.  Prevent Circumvention 
The third justification offered in Dirks for requiring evidence of a 
personal benefit is that this test prevents people from circumventing the 
prohibition against insider trading by “selling” or “spending” their 
proprietary access to material nonpublic information to avoid illegally 
trading on inside information.178  
                                                                                                                     
 174. See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
 175. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59 (recognizing a need for a ban on tippee trading while also 
noting the “inhibiting influence” such a ban could have on the role of market analysts).  
 There is an additional policy consideration relevant to a determination of whether a personal 
benefit test remains a useful common law construct. The Supreme Court in O’Hagan expanded 
the types of policy concerns it considered relevant to the analysis of when to impose insider 
trading liability. As Nagy points out, in the O’Hagan decision, “Justice Ginsburg framed 
the . . . misappropriation theory to advance the important policy objectives of ensuring ‘honest 
securities markets’ and promoting ‘investor confidence.’” Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 
18 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)). This additional policy 
consideration, Nagy argues, suggests that a broader prohibition against selective disclosure makes 
sense. Id. at 40–41. 
 176. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59.  
 177. See supra Section II.A. 
 178. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
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This anti-circumvention goal does not justify limiting liability for 
selective disclosure to situations in which there is either an exchange for 
“a pecuniary gain” or “a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend.”179 If the goal is to prevent circumventing the 
prohibition against insider trading, then the appropriate rule should 
simply prohibit unauthorized selective disclosure of the information.180 
The common law long ago recognized that an outright prohibition on 
gifting property that belongs to another without permission is the most 
efficient way to prevent agents from benefiting indirectly where direct 
benefits are prohibited. If preventing circumvention is the goal of a ban 
on selective disclosure, then there is no good reason to reject the common 
law prohibition on gifting someone else’s property. 
4.  Element of a Fraud or a Fiduciary Breach 
A fourth justification offered for the Court’s adoption of the personal 
benefit test in Dirks was that only a personal benefit test could properly 
identify situations where an insider had either acted fraudulently or 
breached a fiduciary duty when making a selective disclosure.181 But, as 
discussed above, common law precedent does not compel this 
conclusion. The common law does not treat evidence of a personal benefit 
as a necessary element to conclude that conduct is deceptive or that a 
fiduciary duty breach has occurred.182 
This disconnect is even more pronounced in 2017 than it was in 1983. 
As Professor Donna Nagy has eloquently shown, since the Dirks 
decision, Delaware state courts have expanded the types of conduct that 
would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty beyond just transactions 
that involve self-enrichment.183 These developments in state fiduciary 
law mean that the connections between receipt of a personal benefit and 
the breach of a fiduciary duty, one of the justifications in Dirks for 
introducing a personal benefit test, are even more tenuous than when 
Dirks was decided. 
In 1983 the Supreme Court was creating new federal common law in 
an effort to make subtle and challenging distinctions between legal and 
illegal selective disclosures by individuals working at public companies. 
Such distinctions are much easier to make in 2017. Not only does 
Regulation FD disallow virtually all selective disclosures made to 
someone who intends to trade based on the disclosed information, but 
also public companies now have policies that prohibit employees from 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59; see supra text accompanying notes 61–62.  
 180. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Subsection I.A.4. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 76–83.  
 183. Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 43–45. 
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making these kinds of disclosures.184  
In 2017, one can be fairly certain that the intentional selective 
disclosure of material nonpublic information violates either Regulation 
FD, firm policy, or both. The rationales for requiring evidence of a 
personal benefit test to find that a selective disclosure is wrongful, offered 
in 1983, point in a new direction in 2017. Evidence of a personal benefit 
is no longer necessary to safely conclude that tipper wrongdoing has 
occurred. 
B.  Is the Personal Benefit Test Binding Precedent? 
Even if the logic that justified requiring introduction of a personal 
benefit test in Dirks no longer justifies the same conclusion today, there 
is an alternative justification for continuing to require proof of a personal 
benefit. That justification comes not from the Court’s reasoning about 
why a personal benefit test made sense, but simply from the fact that this 
was the holding in Dirks. The rule of stare decisis could provide a good 
enough reason for continuing to require proof of a personal benefit, 
notwithstanding major changes since the Dirks case was decided in 
1983.185  
This Section addresses the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate 
to reconsider a precedent simply because circumstances have changed. 
For two reasons, stare decisis does not apply to the Dirks personal benefit 
test. First, the Dirks personal benefit test, as a species of federal common 
law, is the type of precedent a court needs to reevaluate in the light of 
changed circumstances.186 Second, as with much of the insider trading 
doctrine, the discussion of a personal benefit test in Dirks is dicta and not 
an actual holding in the case.187 This Section discusses each of these 
reasons stare decisis should not apply to the Dirks personal benefit test. 
1.  Stare Decisis and Federal Common Law 
Weighing the impact of changes in market practices and regulations 
since Dirks might seem inappropriate, because of the general principle of 
stare decisis. Stare decisis is the principle that “today’s Court should 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,598 (Dec. 28, 
1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249); supra text accompanying notes 127–28. 
 185. Brief for the United States at 29, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No.15-
628) (“Principles of stare decisis apply with special force here because Dirks—and its holding 
that a tipper personally benefits by giving a gift—has been the law for more than 30 years.”). This 
appears to be adding a required element that is not clearly enunciated in either the Dirks or 
O’Hagan opinions, but which can logically be inferred from the combination of these two earlier 
opinions.  
 186. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
 187. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
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stand by yesterday’s decisions.”188 But in certain situations, even a court 
committed to stare decisis should take into account changed 
circumstances. The Dirks personal benefit test, which combines statutory 
interpretation and federal common law, would appear to be such a 
situation.  
On first impression, the Dirks decision, because it involves an 
interpretation of a federal securities statute, might seem entitled to a 
higher level of deference than other types of precedent. The Supreme 
Court has held that in cases involving statutory interpretation the Court is 
more forcefully bound by past precedent than in cases involving common 
law or constitutional matters.189 The theory behind granting a higher level 
of deference to cases involving statutory interpretation is that Congress 
can step in and override a court’s interpretation, if Congress is dissatisfied 
with the court’s reading of the statute.190 For example, in the Supreme 
Court decision Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the Court relied on 
this theory and refused to overturn a precedent that interpreted a patent 
statute, despite strong arguments that the statute was wrongly 
interpreted.191  
However, not all cases involving statutory interpretation are shown 
equal deference by the Court. The Supreme Court also recognizes that in 
certain areas of statutory interpretation Congress has turned to the federal 
courts to fill in the interstices of the law necessary to achieve a general 
purpose established by the statute. In these situations, the Court is acting 
more as a court of common law, and the Court treats a precedent 
involving a statutory interpretation in this context as they would a 
common law precedent, which means that holdings need to be updated as 
circumstances change.192  
This exception to the general rule of heightened deference to cases 
involving statutory interpretation comes into play in the area of antitrust 
law, for example. Justice Elena Kagan recognized this exception in her 
majority opinion in Kimble, writing: “This Court has viewed stare decisis 
as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman 
Act . . . . We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis 
as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
 189. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 319 (2005) (“The Supreme Court has accorded heightened deference to its statutory 
precedent for roughly a century.”). But see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling 
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 (1988) (proposing a weakened standard to 
overrule statutory precedents). 
 190. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409.  
 191. Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932)).  
 192. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 1364.  
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precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”193 
Insider trading jurisprudence would appear to be similar to antitrust 
jurisprudence in this respect. Time and again Congress has shown its 
desire to delegate to the federal courts the task of delineating precisely 
what kind of behavior constitutes illegal insider trading. For example, 
when legislation in 1984 and in 1988 increased penalties for insider 
trading violations, Congress decided not to include provisions that would 
specify which particular types of conduct constitute illegal insider 
trading, preferring to continue to defer to the courts to make this 
determination.194 Similarly, when the Stock Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 restricted insider trading by members 
of Congress, the final bill included “explicit legislative recognition that 
the Exchange Act encompasses insider trading prohibitions that arise 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”195 Here again Congress chose to 
defer to the judiciary’s determination of what constitutes insider trading. 
If the analogy between antitrust law and insider trading jurisprudence 
is correct, then requiring evidence of personal benefit to prove that a 
selective disclosure is deceptive is a precedent that could be reevaluated 
in light of changed circumstances. And, as described above, 
circumstances with respect to what constitutes a legitimate selective 
disclosure and what kinds of deceptive practices might trigger insider 
trading liability have changed dramatically since 1983.196 
2.  Personal Benefit Test Is Dicta 
Additionally, courts might not be bound by the personal benefit test 
enunciated in Dirks because the discussion of a personal benefit test in 
Dirks is almost certainly dicta. To understand why the Dirks personal 
benefit test is dicta, it is necessary to step back and review all the issues 
regarding selective disclosure liability addressed by the Court in Dirks. 
The Dirks opinion addresses three different questions that arise when 
considering whether a selective disclosure might lead to an insider trading 
violation. These are: (1) What makes the tipper’s actions sufficiently 
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability? (2) Can the tippee face 
insider trading liability absent improper conduct by the tipper? and (3) 
How much tippee involvement in wrongdoing is necessary for her to face 
liability?197  
                                                                                                                     
 193. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412–13 (citation omitted). But see Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare 
Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2015) (arguing that the ways in which stare decisis is applied 
to antitrust law are more complex than suggested by the Kimble opinion). 
 194. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 195. Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 34. 
 196. See supra Part II. 
 197. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665, 667 (1983). 
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An analysis of the answers the Court provides in Dirks to the second 
and third of these questions is presented below. This analysis shows that 
the answers to these two questions, given the facts in Dirks, provide more 
than sufficient grounds for the Court to conclude that there should not be 
insider trading liability imposed in the Dirks case. The Court did not need 
to resolve when a selective disclosure is a manipulative or deceptive 
practice to reverse the decision against Dirks. The entire discussion of a 
personal benefit test in Dirks is dicta.198 
In deciding Dirks, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed how 
to determine insider trading liability when information is covertly passed 
from one person to another. In doing so, the Court needed to resolve a 
number of issues related to this type of wrongdoing. One question to be 
addressed was whether a tippee can face insider trading liability absent 
improper conduct by the tipper (the second question listed above). Dirks 
held that if there is no tipper wrongdoing then there will be no tippee 
liability.199  
This holding, that tippee liability is exclusively derivative of tipper 
liability, appears at various points throughout the Dirks opinion. For 
example, Justice Powell writes in the majority opinion that “some tippees 
must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because they 
receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available 
to them improperly.”200 This is why the Court describes liability for 
trading based on nonpublic information as “derivative” of wrongdoing by 
the person providing the information.201 The statement in Dirks that “the 
tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s 
duty”202 summarizes the idea that the recipient of selectively disclosed 
material nonpublic information will not face insider trading liability 
absent improper conduct by the party that provided the information. 
The conclusion that tippee liability is derivative of tipper liability 
would seem to follow logically from the Court’s holding three years 
earlier in Chiarella v. United States.203 In Chiarella, the majority wrote 
that “[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can 
be no fraud absent a duty to speak,” and that no such duty arises “from 
                                                                                                                     
 198. However, it is noteworthy that the Salman opinion does not treat the Dirks personal 
benefit test as dicta. Alito writes: “Salman points out that many insider trading cases—including 
several that Dirks cited—involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading 
information. But this observation does not undermine the test Dirks articulated and applied.” 
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (emphasis added).  
 199. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.  
 200. Id. at 660 (emphasis omitted). 
 201. Id. at 662.  
 202. Id. at 659.  
 203. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”204 In fact, a 
footnote in Dirks states that Chiarella compels the conclusion that tippee 
liability can only be derivative.205  
But how Chiarella helps to address whether someone who trades 
using selectively disclosed information should face insider trading 
liability absent wrongdoing by the tipper is not as self-evident as the 
Dirks opinion implies.206 Rather, other considerations provide more 
direct support for the holding that tippee liability is exclusively derivative 
                                                                                                                     
 204. Id. at 235.  
 205. The footnote in Dirks explains the relevance of Chiarella as follows:  
As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of nonpublic information does 
not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does 
that. And we do not believe that the mere receipt of information from an insider 
creates such a special relationship between the tippee and the corporation’s 
shareholders.  
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15. 
 206. The only discussion in Chiarella about the situation where someone trades using 
selectively disclosed material nonpublic information appears in the following footnote: 
“Tippees” of corporate insiders have been held liable under §10(b) because they 
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know is 
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider. The 
tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty. 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (citation omitted). 
The first sentence in this footnote might reasonably be read to endorse the idea that it is the 
confidential nature of the information, and not the purpose for which it was disclosed, which 
makes trading based upon selective disclosed information a violation of § 10(b). This is opposite 
to the conclusion in Dirks that liability from trading on selectively disclosed information can only 
be derivative. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. Moreover, the case Chiarella cited, Shapiro v. Merrill 
Lynch, holds that the confidential nature of the information provided in a selective disclosure can 
be sufficient to trigger tippee liability. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Since upon the admitted facts before us the selling defendants 
knew or should have known of the confidential corporate source of the revised earnings 
information and they knew of its non-public nature, they were under a duty not to trade . . . .”). 
For an alternative reading of this sentence in the Chiarella footnote, see Coles, supra note 5, at 
203–04. 
It is intriguing that in initially communicating with his fellow Justices about the Dirks case, 
Justice Powell chose to exclude this first sentence of the Chiarella footnote from his review of 
the relevant discussion in Chiarella, perhaps because it might be read to endorse a broader test 
for tippee liability than he preferred. See Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 860. 
On the other hand, the second sentence in the Chiarella footnote does suggest that liability 
based on selective disclosure can only result when the individual who selectively discloses the 
information does so in breach of a fiduciary duty. Overall, the discussion in the Chiarella footnote 
is equivocal as to whether trading based on selectively disclosed material nonpublic information 
can provide an independent basis for insider trading liability. 
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of wrongdoing by the tipper. For example, the majority in Dirks cites a 
statement directly on point in oral argument by SEC attorney Paul 
Gonson. Gonson stated that the liability of Dirks and others who traded 
“is derivative of Secrist’s duty in this case.”207 The Dirks opinion also 
cites the concurring opinion of an SEC Commissioner in an enforcement 
case involving liability for trading based on information that was 
selectively disclosed to an outsider.208 In that case, Investors 
Management Co., the Commissioner wrote in a concurrence that the 
“[t]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility.”209 
The Dirks majority appears to be concerned that allowing a basis for 
tippee liability other than wrongdoing by the tipper would require 
accepting that insider trading liability can attach whenever someone 
comes “into possession of material ‘corporate information that they know 
is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate 
insider.’”210 The Dirks majority chooses to reject explicitly the purported 
view “the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic 
material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
before trading.”211 
Another question Dirks addresses about the link between selective 
disclosure and insider trading is: How much involvement in wrongdoing 
by the recipient of information (the tippee) is necessary for that person to 
face liability (the third question listed above)?212 A court might provide 
a wide range of answers to this question. At one extreme, a court might 
apply a strict liability rule. Under such a rule, no involvement with or 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the selective disclosure would be 
necessary to trigger liability, so long as the selective disclosure itself was 
wrongful.213 At the other extreme, a court could apply something 
comparable to an aiding and abetting standard. Under such a rule, a court 
would only impose liability on a person who trades on selectively 
disclosed information if that individual was also involved as an 
accomplice in the act of wrongful selective disclosure.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 207. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276); see Dirks, 
463 U.S. at 659 (“[T]he tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s 
duty.”). 
 208. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.19 (citing Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971) (Smith, 
Comm’r, concurring)). 
 209. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. at 651 (Smith, Comm’r, concurring).  
 210. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. 
 211. Id. at 656. 
 212. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
 213. Such a rule is sometimes applied to the possession of stolen goods. See, e.g., Stuart P. 
Green, Thieving and Receiving: Overcriminalizing the Possession of Stolen Property, 14 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 35, 35–36 (2011). 
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The Supreme Court in Dirks provides something of a middle-ground 
answer to this question of how much “involvement” by the tippee is 
required to trigger tippee insider trading liability, stating: 
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic 
information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach.214  
The Dirks Court settles here on a negligence-like standard to resolve the 
question of what level of involvement will trigger tippee liability.215  
The most surprising aspect of this particular aspect of the holding in 
Dirks is how little attention it receives, despite the relatively novel nature 
of the question. The “knows or should know” standard appears only once 
in the Dirks opinion.216 Moreover, the footnotes supporting this 
conclusion cite cases that offer a variety of standards for determining the 
level of tippee involvement necessary to trigger insider trading liability. 
While some of the cases Dirks cites to support this holding do apply a 
“knows or should have known” standard to determine the extent of tippee 
involvement necessary to trigger tippee insider trading liability, others do 
not.217  
                                                                                                                     
 214. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added).  Surprisingly, the Salman opinion misstates 
the test as requiring actual knowledge of the tipper wrongdoing. Alito writes: “The tippee acquires 
the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information was 
disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in 
disregard of that knowledge.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (emphasis 
added). This may reflect an effort to shift away from the “knows or should know” standard in 
Dirks, or could simply reflects the fact that in Salman the tipper did have actual knowledge of the 
tippee wrongdoing. 
 215. Langevoort, at points in his treatise, seems to suggest that the personal benefit test in 
Dirks is a means to evaluate the tippee’s level of “involvement” in the selective disclosure. In 
Section 6:13, Langevoort writes: 
The only way to taint a tippee with responsibility for such a [misappropriation] 
breach is to find a co-venture with the actual fiduciary, and for better or worse, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that such coventures exist only where there is 
something like a quid pro quo involved in the tip. 
18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 6:13. This is not how this author understands the role the 
personal benefit test plays in the opinion. Rather, the personal benefit test appears solely relevant 
to determining the wrongfulness of the tipper’s selective disclosure. 
 216. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.  
 217. On the one hand, the Dirks Court correctly notes that in In re Investors Management 
Co., the “SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed only in circumstances 
where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that” the selective disclosure of information was 
wrongful. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.19. The “knows or should know” standard also appears in the 
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Similarly, the Dirks majority opinion favorably cites Mosser v. 
Darrow218 as support for the proposition that those who trade on 
selectively disclosed information may have liability, but in doing so the 
Dirks majority notes that “the transactions of those who knowingly 
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are ‘as forbidden’ as 
transactions ‘on behalf of the trustee himself.’”219 Observe that here again 
the Dirks Court relies on a precedent without mentioning that the 
precedent does not apply the “knows or should know” standard for 
triggering tippee liability.220 
In any case, the combination of these two holdings, first, that tippee 
liability is derivative, and second, that such liability is only imposed when 
the tippee “knows or should know” of the breach, makes clear why the 
discussion in Dirks about the personal benefit test is actually just dicta.221 
                                                                                                                     
footnote in Chiarella that discusses liability for those who trade based on selectively disclosed 
information. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). For a more detailed 
discussion of this footnote, see supra note 199. 
On the other hand, Dirks cites two Restatement provisions relating to when liability passes to 
someone who receives information in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information 
that both require actual knowledge. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.20. The Restatement of Agency 
provision requires actual knowledge (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. c (“A person 
who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential 
information from the agent, may be [deemed] . . . a constructive trustee.”)), as does the 
Restatement of Restitution(RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1937) 
(“Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential 
information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon 
a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.”)). 
 218. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).  
 219. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added) (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 
(1951)). 
 220. In fact, Pritchard found that earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion included an actual 
knowledge standard, that only the final draft contained the “knows or should know” standard, and 
that there is no written record as to why the “knows or should know” standard was included in the 
final versions of the opinion. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 864. 
Pritchard contacted the clerk who assisted in preparing the Dirks opinion to ask why the 
“knows or should know” standard was adopted. Id. at 865 & n.43. The clerk’s recollection was 
that this standard was incorporated “to make the opinion more consistent with those authorities 
as well as the concurring opinion of Commissioner Smith in In re Investors Management Co.” 
Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865. The “knows or should know” language would also make 
the standard consistent with footnote 12 of the Chiarella decision. See supra note 199. 
 221. The Black’s Law Dictionary definition of judicial dictum is an “opinion by a court on a 
question that is directly involved . . . , but that is not essential to the decision and therefore not 
binding even if it may later be accorded some weight.” Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). But see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
953, 1065 (2005) (offering the following alternative definition: “A holding consists of those 
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, 
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Based on these two holdings for Dirks to face insider trading liability, it 
must be true that there was wrongdoing on the part of the original tipper, 
Ronald Secrist, and that Dirks either knew or should have known about 
this wrongdoing. However, no claim was ever made that Secrist’s original 
disclosure constituted deceptive conduct or wrongdoing. A footnote in 
the Dirks opinion observes that “we do not understand the SEC to have 
relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in finding that Dirks 
breached his duty to Equity Funding’s shareholders.”222 Therefore, the 
case against Dirks can be fully resolved without delving into what type 
of behavior would have constituted wrongdoing by Secrist if the facts had 
been different than those in the present case.223  
Justice Powell recognized early on that the discussion of what 
constitutes tipper wrongdoing in Dirks would be dicta when he wrote to 
his clerk: “Dirks is easy, but is there a general principle?”224 Similarly, 
the first memorandum from Justice Powell on the case to his fellow 
Justices observed that the “SEC . . . recognized that ‘Dirks’ informants 
were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud.’”225 The personal 
benefit test discussion involved a counter-factual situation.  
If the personal benefit test is dicta, the Court is not bound to follow it 
as precedent. Similarly, the doctrine of stare decisis does not provide a 
compelling reason to ignore changes in securities markets practices and 
regulations, most importantly the enactment of Regulation FD and the 
O’Hagan decision, when considering whether or how to update the Dirks 
test for determining when a selective disclosure is sufficiently deceptive 
to trigger insider trading liability. It is not just appropriate but 
increasingly necessary to consider anew how to determine when a 
selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to trigger insider trading 
liability. 
                                                                                                                     
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition 
stated in a case counts as dicta”). 
 222. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27. The Court also concludes in reversing Dirks’ conviction 
with a restatement of the tippee derivative liability footnote from Chiarella. “In the absence of a 
breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. Dirks 
therefore could not have been ‘a participant after the fact in [an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary 
duty.”’ Id. at 667 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).  
 223. Langevoort reaches the same conclusion about whether the discussion of the personal 
benefit test was necessary given the other two holdings in the opinion, and writes that the “Court 
could have stopped its analysis here and still reversed the Commission, for it was clear, to the 
majority at least, that there had been no breach of fiduciary duty by the former Equity Funding 
employees . . . .” 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:3. 
 224. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 862.  
 225. Bobtail Bench Memorandum at 3, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (No. 82-276) (alteration in 
original). 
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IV.  A MULTIPLE TRIGGER TEST FOR TIPPER WRONGDOING 
To update the test for when a selective disclosure is sufficiently 
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability, the appropriate starting point 
is the underlying statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct.226 This 
statutory prohibition against any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance no longer justifies making evidence of a personal benefit a 
necessary condition for determining whether a selective disclosure 
should trigger insider trading liability. A better test would recognize that 
a personal benefit provides evidence that is likely sufficient, but by no 
means necessary, to determine when a selective disclosure is deceptive. 
The better approach, which this Article calls the multiple trigger 
approach, would recognize that there are several ways to find that a 
selective disclosure is sufficiently deceptive to trigger insider trading 
liability. 
This Section details this multiple trigger approach, considering in 
detail two scenarios in which the multiple trigger approach would 
correctly conclude that a selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to 
trigger insider trading liability, but in which neither a personal benefit test 
nor a breach of a fiduciary duty test would reach the correct result.  
A.  Deception Without Personal Benefit or Fiduciary Breach 
The basic problem with exclusive reliance on the personal benefit test 
(or on a test requiring evidence of a fiduciary duty breach) to determine 
when a selective disclosure triggers insider trading liability is that such a 
test is unjustifiably underinclusive. There are many situations in which a 
selective disclosure unequivocally constitutes a deceptive practice, but in 
which there might be neither a personal benefit nor a fiduciary duty 
breach. In such situations, there is no good reason to hold as a matter of 
law that the selective disclosure cannot trigger insider trading liability.227 
This Section describes two scenarios where there is a selective 
disclosure involving deceptive conduct, but where there is neither a 
personal benefit nor a fiduciary duty breach. In the first scenario, a 
computer hacker deceives employees at a public company to gain access 
to material nonpublic information and then selectively discloses that 
information to a distant friend as a gesture of friendship. That friend, who 
is fully cognizant of the deception used to gather the information, trades 
for a profit using the information. The second scenario involves the 
                                                                                                                     
 226. More specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act refers to “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,” and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder 
refers to “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” See supra note 8. 
 227. In many ways the argument here parallels the analysis in Dorozhko except that the 
question here involves whether a selective disclosure rather than the garnering of material 
nonpublic information involves deceptive conduct. 
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doctrinally more complex situation in which an insider at a public 
company selectively discloses material nonpublic information about the 
firm in violation of Regulation FD, but the insider’s supervisor sanctions 
this disclosure. 
1.  Computer Hacking 
The first scenario involves a computer hacker who passes material 
nonpublic information on to a distant friend. This scenario is a modified 
version of the situation analyzed by the Second Circuit panel in the 
Dorozhko case.228 
Suppose that a computer hacker gains access to a company’s material 
nonpublic information that she intends to use for securities trading 
purposes by misrepresenting herself as an employee who misplaced her 
user information. Then she passes this material nonpublic information on 
to a distant friend as a gesture of friendship. The friend knows how the 
information was generated, and still trades on the information for a profit 
in the stock market.  
The question in this first scenario is whether the distant friend’s trade 
violates Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 
Under the Dirks rule that tippee liability can only be derivative of tipper 
wrongdoing229 the crucial issue is whether the computer hacker’s 
purloining of material nonpublic information was sufficiently wrongful 
to trigger insider trading liability. 
The evaluation of tipper wrongdoing in this scenario—if based on the 
underlying statutory prohibition—would involve two questions. First, 
was there deceptive conduct? Here the answer is obviously yes, as the 
hacker gained access to the information through an act of deception.  
There is no need in this scenario, other than to follow the Dirks precedent, 
to consider whether the tipper’s personal benefit was sufficient to make 
the act by which the tipper gained access to the information deceptive. 
The deceptive nature of the act is self-evident.230 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. The risks that this type of computer 
hacking might pose to securities markets are significant, as suggested by charges brought in 2015 
against hackers who were accused of gaining access to over 150,000 unreleased news stories 
related to both public and private companies. See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, 
Nine Charged in Insider Trading Case Tied to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/business/dealbook/insider-trading-sec-hacking-case.html? 
_r=0l. See generally Robert T. Denny, Beyond Mere Theft: Why Computer Hackers Trading on 
Wrongfully Acquired Information Should Be Held Accountable Under the Securities Exchange 
Act, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 963 (highlighting confusion about whether computer hackers can be liable 
under the Securities Exchange Act). 
 229. See supra notes 193–204 and accompanying text. 
 230. This conclusion is, among other things, supported by SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
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The second question in evaluating whether there is tippee liability in 
this scenario—if based on the underlying statutory prohibition—would 
be whether the tipper’s deception is sufficiently “in connection with” a 
securities transaction to violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.231 In 
O’Hagan, the Court held that if someone “misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to 
the source of the information,”232 his action is sufficiently in connection 
with such a securities transaction to trigger insider trading liability.  That 
case did not, however, involve passing along information between tippers 
and tippees, which further extenuates the connection between the 
deceptive conduct and securities market trading. The anti-circumvention 
rationale for adopting a rule creating tipper and tippee liability in Dirks 
should resolve the issue of whether to extend tipper/tippee liability to this 
situation.233 Allowing tippers to achieve by indirection what is otherwise 
illegal would make little sense. 
To summarize, the correct holding in this first scenario would be to 
find the tippee liable for an insider trading violation if the analysis is 
based on the underlying statute and the facts presented. The tipper’s 
behavior involved deception in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities and the tippee knew this. Reaching this conclusion did not 
require investigating either the depth of the personal relationship between 
the tipper and the tippee or the nature of the fiduciary duty breach by the 
tipper. In fact, in this first scenario, it is unlikely that either a personal 
benefit test (because they were distant friends) or a breach of a fiduciary 
duty test (because the hacker did not have a fiduciary relationship with 
the company) would lead to the correct conclusion that the tipper 
wrongdoing should trigger insider trading liability. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 231. See supra note 8.   
 232. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).  
 233. In fact, the Solicitor General’s brief in the Salman case assumed that the Dirks opinion 
had already addressed the issue of what would be required for a tipper’s actions to be sufficiently 
in connection with a purchase or sale to trigger insider trading liability, stating that one of the 
elements of the tipper’s wrongdoing in Dirks is that the tipper provides the tip “knowing or 
expecting that the information will be used for securities trading. . . . The insider’s knowledge that 
a tippee will ‘exploit[]’ the confidential information in trading is thus critical to finding securities 
fraud.” Brief for the United States, supra note 178, at 23 (alteration in original). The heading of 
this section of the brief states: “Dirks makes clear that the tipper’s understanding that the 
information will be used for trading by a tippee is critical to liability.” Id. There is, however, no 
explicit statement in either the Dirks or O’Hagan regarding the extent to which tippers beliefs 
about whether the selectively disclosed information would be used for securities trading is 
relevant to a finding of tipper wrongdoing. 
49
Guttentag: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
568 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
 
2.  Company-Sanctioned Selective Disclosure 
A second, more analytically challenging scenario involves an insider 
at a public company making a selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information to a distant friend in violation of Regulation FD, but also 
assuming the insider’s supervisor at the company sanctions the selective 
disclosure. This scenario, as with the first scenario discussed above, 
explores the tradeoffs between a multiple trigger approach, a personal 
benefit test, and a fiduciary duty breach test for tipper wrongdoing. 
In this scenario, let us assume the tipper is covered by the provisions 
of Regulation FD. For example, the tipper might be an individual who 
works at a public company in a position where she regularly 
communicates with investors.234 Further, let us assume, as noted above, 
this tipper’s supervisor instructed her to make this selective disclosure. 
Finally, assume this tipper is fully aware that such selective disclosure 
violates both Regulation FD and the firm’s stated policy against selective 
disclosure of such information. This scenario is similar in some respects 
to the facts in the Newman case, at least as understood by the Second 
Circuit panel that decided the case.235 
The question now becomes how to determine whether this tipper’s 
sanctioned disclosure in violation of Regulation FD is sufficiently 
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability. Under the personal benefit 
test, a court would look to the nature of the relationship between the tipper 
and the tippee, much as the panel in Newman did, even though the 
relationship between the tipper and tippee in this scenario has little to do 
with whether the tipper’s behavior was deceptive. For example, if the 
tipper’s selective disclosure were to a close friend there might be clear 
evidence of a personal benefit based on the Dirks standard, but whether 
the conduct was deceptive would still remain an open question, because 
the disclosure was sanctioned. Using a fiduciary duty test to determine 
tipper wrongdoing in this scenario would require answering complicated 
questions about how fiduciary duty law deals with situations in which a 
principal’s instructions contradict either federal rules or guidance from 
that principal’s ultimate principal. 
The multiple trigger approach works much better, because it simply 
requires making a determination of whether her behavior involved 
deceptive conduct. This is the central issue that the personal benefit test 
                                                                                                                     
 234. See supra text accompanying note 123. For a discussion of what makes a company 
public, see Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the 
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 152–53 (2013). 
 235. United States v. Newman, 733 F.3d 438, 455 (2d Cir. 2014) (“That is especially true 
here, where the evidence showed that corporate insiders at Dell and NVIDIA regularly engaged 
with analysts and routinely selectively disclosed the same type of information.”). The Newman 
panel did not address the question of whether or to what extent this practice would violate 
Regulation FD. 
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or a fiduciary duty approach only addresses indirectly. So, is the tipper’s 
behavior in this scenario deceptive? Clearly, yes. While the tipper may 
not have deceived her immediate principal, the tipper deceived both the 
ultimate principal, the firm, which has adopted a policy prohibiting such 
behavior, and the federal government by violating a rule prohibiting this 
type of selective disclosure. At least some degree of deception on her part 
was necessary to carry out this selective disclosure.  
These two scenarios, one involving a computer hacker and one 
involving a sanctioned violation of Regulation FD, illustrate that neither 
a personal benefit test nor a fiduciary duty test does a good job of 
identifying situations in which a selective disclosure constitutes a 
deceptive practice.236 After the enactment of Regulation FD and the 
decision in O’Hagan, there is little justification for continuing to cabin 
the analysis of the potential wrongfulness of a selective disclosure into 
either a personal benefit test or a breach of fiduciary duty test.  
Unfortunately, the Salman237 decision did not help advance the 
analysis of when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information should trigger insider trading liability. In Salman, the tipper 
wrongdoing involved all three of the wrongs that could plausibly be relied 
upon as providing a sufficient basis for triggering insider trading liability. 
There was deceptive conduct, a violation of company policy, and receipt 
of the type of personal benefit specifically described in Dirks. The facts 
of Salman allowed the Court to avoid addressing important questions 
about when a selective disclosure should trigger insider trading liability 
after the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision.238 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explains why the Court first introduced the rule in Dirks 
that the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information can only 
trigger insider trading liability if “the insider personally will benefit, 
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure,”239 and shows that the various 
rationales for adopting this rule no longer justify making evidence of a 
personal benefit a necessary condition for identifying when a selective 
                                                                                                                     
 236. The fiduciary duty aspects of insider trading jurisprudence have always had an uneasy 
relationship with the statutory language that prohibits manipulative or deceptive practices. Nagy 
uses the apt term of fiduciary “fictions” to describe the Supreme Court’s logic in certain insider 
trading cases. Nagy, supra note 10, at 1337. One response on the part of lower courts and the SEC 
to this mismatch is that as a descriptive matter, according to Nagy’s analysis, “a host of lower 
courts and the SEC have in effect concluded that the offense of insider trading focuses on a 
person’s wrongful use of confidential information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty is 
breached.” Id. at 1337. 
 237. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).  
 238. See Guttentag, supra note 9. 
 239. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
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disclosure involves deceptive conduct and triggers insider trading 
liability.  
In particular, the personal benefit test in Dirks: (1) no longer 
establishes reliable objective criteria for determining when a selective 
disclosure is wrongful, (2) can no longer be justified as necessary to allow 
corporate communications which in 2017 would violate Regulation FD, 
(3) does a poor job of preventing the circumvention of the insider trading 
prohibition, and (4) does not reliably indicate the presence or absence of 
deceptive conduct.240 There is little reason to continue to force federal 
courts to try and resolve nettlesome questions about personal benefit and 
fiduciary duty breach when the legal issues can be more easily and 
directly resolved by looking directly to the relevant statutory language.  
The personal benefit test as a necessary condition for finding tipper 
wrongdoing should be acknowledged for what it is: a spandrel that might 
be sufficient but is certainly no longer a necessary element for identifying 
when a selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to violate the 
Securities Exchange Act.241 
                                                                                                                     
 240. See supra Section III.A. 
 241. For a more general discussion of spandrels, see S.J. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The 
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist 
Programme, 205 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B. 581, 581–82 (1979). 
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